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This Article critically evaluates the relationship between constructing narra-
tives and achieving factual accuracy at trials. The story model of adjudication—
according to which jurors process testimony by organizing it into competing
narratives—has gained wide acceptance in the descriptive work of social
scientists and currency in the courtroom, but it has received little close attention
from legal theorists. The Article begins with a discussion of the meaning of
narrative and its function at trial. It argues that the story model is incomplete,
and that “legal truth” emerges from a hybrid of narrative and other means of
inquiry. As a result, trials contain opportunities to promote more systematic
consideration of evidence. Second, the Article asserts that, to the extent the
story model is descriptively correct with respect to the structure of juror
decision making, it also gives rise to normative concerns about the tension
between characteristic features of narrative and the truth-seeking aspirations of
trial. Viewing trials through the lens of narrative theory brings sources of bias
and error into focus and suggests reasons to increase the inﬂuence of analytic
processes. The Article then appraises improvements in trial mechanics—from
prosecutorial discovery obligations through appellate review of evidentiary
errors—that might account for the inﬂuence of stories. For example, a fuller
understanding of narrative exposes the false assumption within limiting instruc-
tions that any piece of evidence exists in isolation. And to better inform how
adjudicators respond to stories in the courtroom, the Article argues for modify-
ing instructions in terms of their candor, explanatory content, and timing.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Mark Jensen stood trial for the murder of his wife Julie in a Kenosha
County Circuit Court in Wisconsin.1 At one point in the trial, the presiding
judge commented: “People who think you can try a case off a script, they ought
to read this transcript.”2 What is striking about the transcript, however, is that it
does indeed call to mind a script. The case evokes familiar narrative constructs
about unfaithful spouses and abusive relationships, and even the marquee piece
of evidence was a tried and true literary device: a “letter from the grave” to be
opened in the event of the victim’s death.3 Despite strong advocacy on both
sides of the case and the court’s steady hand, the record leaves a sense of
disquiet about the outcome. That uneasiness arises in part from the overpower-
ing effect of a dominant narrative that may have obscured the inconclusive and
inconsistent nature of some evidence.
The known facts include that Julie Jensen died at her home in Pleasant
Prairie, Wisconsin on December 3, 1998.4 She had been married to Mark Jensen
1. See State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶¶ 1, 19, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 447, 455, 794 N.W.2d 482, 486,
490 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010).
2. See Pornographic Pictures at Center of Jensen Trial Monday, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2008), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?vkjLl5ioOt94 (at 1:46).
3. See State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26 ¶ 5, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 273, 727 N.W.2d 518, 521. The defense
argued that this tactic was “out of the movies,” and the media frequently described the case as one
involving a “letter from the grave.” See, e.g., Carrie Antlﬁnger, Wis. Jury Hears Dead Wife’s Letter,
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/07/
AR2008010702958.html; Mallory Simon, Jury: Letter from Grave Was ‘Road Map’ to Murderer,
CNN.COM (Feb. 25, 2008), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/02/22/jensen.jurors/index.html.
4. Eric LaRose, Kenosha Man Charged in Wife’s 1998 Poisoning Death, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Mar. 21, 2002, http://news.google.com/newspapers?id1KcaAAAAIBAJ&sjidmj8EAAAAIBAJ&
pg3737%2C331796.
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for fourteen years, and they had two sons, ages eight and three at the time of her
death.5 The case was at ﬁrst treated as a suicide. Initial autopsy and toxicology
reports were inconclusive, but tissue samples examined two years later estab-
lished that Julie had ingested ethylene glycol, a poisonous substance commonly
found in antifreeze.6 Later analysis of the Jensen home computer revealed
Internet searches seeking information about various methods of poisoning.7
Mark Jensen’s e-mail correspondence also exposed his long-term affair.8 After
Julie’s death, he began living with his girlfriend, and they later married.9 On
March 19, 2002, Mark was charged with ﬁrst-degree intentional homicide.10
The narrative the prosecution advanced at trial was framed by Julie Jensen’s
own account. Ten days before her death, Julie visited her neighbor and tearfully
handed him a sealed envelope. If anything should happen to her, she said, he
was to deliver it to the police.11 That document became the focal point of more
than a decade of litigation to determine the legal truth about the events that led
to Julie’s death.12 In the letter, Julie expressed fear for her life because Mark
had never forgiven her for a brief affair she had seven years before.13 She
identiﬁed Mark as the “ﬁrst suspect” should anything happen to her and noted
that he was an “avid” Internet user. She also detailed the medicines she was
taking but denied abusing alcohol. And she disavowed any suicidal tendencies,
citing her love for her sons. The letter concluded: “I pray I’m wrong [and]
nothing happens . . . but I am suspicious of Mark’s behaviors [and] fear for my
early demise.”14 Julie made similarly foreboding comments to a police ofﬁcer
with whom she was acquainted, one of her son’s teachers, and her sister-in-law
in the weeks before she died.15
Mark and Julie’s story is in many respects an ancient one, but it emerges in
modern ways, including through dueling websites established by their respec-
tive families and the jurors’ discussions with the media.16 The websites vividly
5. Jessica Hansen, Jury Finds Jensen Guilty in Murder of Wife, KENOSHA NEWS (Oct. 27, 2008),
http://www.kenoshanews.com/news/jury_ﬁnds_jensen_guilty_in_murder_of_wife_261151042.html.
6. The Letter, CBS NEWS (Aug. 23, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18559_162-4010441.html.
7. State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 37, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 463, 794 N.W.2d 482, 493 (Wis. Ct. App.
2010).
8. Id.
9. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 74, 331 Wis. at 474, 794 N.W.2d at 499.
10. State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶ 3, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 272, 727 N.W.2d 518, 521.
11. Jay Schadler & Shana Druckerman, ‘Letters From the Grave’ Help Unlock Mystery Behind Two
Mothers’Deaths, ABC NEWS (Aug. 21, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/letters-grave-unlock-mystery-
mothers-deaths/story?id14340121 .ukndve0e8rg
12. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶¶ 28–35, 331 Wis. 2d at 461–62, 794 N.W.2d at 492–93. Mark Jensen’s
challenge to the admissibility of the letter was unsuccessful. Although the appeals court later deter-
mined that recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment may have rendered its admission erroneous, it also concluded that any error was harmless. Id.
13. See Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶ 7, 299 Wis. 2d at 274, 727 N.W.2d at 522.
14. Id.
15. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶¶ 42–43, 331 Wis. 2d at 462, 466, 794 N.W.2d at 495.
16. See, e.g., Jury: Julie Jensen’s Letter Key Evidence: Sentencing Scheduled for Wednesday, WISN:
MILWAUKEE NEWS (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.wisn.com/r/15378697/detail.html.
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represent the competing narratives in the case. “Our Sister Julie,” the site
founded by Julie Jensen’s four brothers, features scrapbook-style pages that
portray a loving mother who suffered silently from abuse.17 Links can be found
throughout the site to resources for victims of domestic violence.18 Mark
Jensen’s website—“Justice Isn’t Always Served”—includes links to innocence
projects and other sources on wrongful convictions.19
In Mark’s narrative, his affair was the reason for Julie’s suicide rather than a
motive for murder. His account begins much earlier in Julie’s life and chronicles
sources of emotional disturbance.20 Various members of Julie’s family battled
alcoholism and depression, including a brother who attempted suicide. She lost
another brother in childhood after a suspicious rough-housing accident at home,
and her mother also mysteriously drowned.21 Trial testimony further established
that Julie had a long-term depressive disorder, for which she was under treat-
ment at the time of her death.22 According to Mark, there was indeed mounting
hostility between him and Julie, but in his version, she was despondent about
the affair and plotted to kill herself and frame her husband in revenge. Julie’s
letter is arguably consistent with this theory, and its timing and curious content
raise doubts about the facts surrounding her death. But it accords as well with
the prosecution’s claim that Julie was enduring emotional abuse, living in fear,
and trapped in a dangerous home environment. Jurors came to see the letter
within the prosecution’s framework and reported that it was the most important
piece of evidence to them; one juror termed it a “clear road map” to convic-
tion.23
After six weeks of trial, thirty-two hours of deliberations, and an early vote
with some jurors undecided and others divided between conviction and acquit-
tal, the jury reached agreement and returned a guilty verdict.24 Mark Jensen
received a sentence of life without parole,25 and his conviction was afﬁrmed in
2010.26 That verdict is the legal truth of what happened to Julie Jensen, but
doubt lingers about whether the jury reached its conclusion by improperly
17. See OUR SISTER JULIE, http://www.oursisterjulie.com/Julie/Home.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
18. Id.
19. MARK JENSEN—JUSTICE ISN’T ALWAYS SERVED, http://www.markjensenlegaldefense.com (last vis-
ited Oct. 17, 2012).
20. Let’s Talk About Julie Jensen, MARK JENSEN—JUSTICE ISN’T ALWAYS SERVED, http://www.mark
jensenlegaldefense.com/who.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
21. Id.
22. Tom Kertscher, Testimony Ends in Poisoning Trial, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 16, 2008.
23. Ann O’Neill, Husband Guilty of Murder in “Letter from Grave” Case, CNN.COM (Feb. 22,
2008), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/02/21/jensen.verdict/index.html (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Julie Jensen’s Letter Points Finger at Mark, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 18, 2009),
http://www.620wtmj.com/news/local/45320097.html.
24. Tom Kertscher, Jensen Guilty of Homicide, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 22, 2008, http://www.
jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/29524184.html.
25. Tom Kertscher, Jensen Gets Life, No Parole, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.
jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/29552414.html.
26. State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 19, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 455, 794 N.W.2d 482, 490 (Wis. Ct. App.
2010).
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relying on a letter admitted in violation of Mark’s Confrontation Clause rights,
and the record raises questions about the factual truth behind Julie’s death as
well. The jury was confronted with a hazy but intensely thematic tale about
events that transpired a decade earlier in the midst of an unraveling marriage
and various betrayals and at the height of at least one spouse’s deep desperation.
Even assuming that every fact the jury heard was true, how did they determine
what the facts meant?
Many social scientists who study juries have concluded that they interpret
information not by considering and weighing each relevant piece of evidence in
turn, but by constructing competing narratives and then deciding which story is
more persuasive. The most plausible story in this case may well be that Mark
Jensen killed his wife, but the question remains whether the prosecution estab-
lished that beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial illustrates how juries rely
unconsciously on narrative to arrive at a verdict and suggests that they ought to
have more explicit guidance about the dangers of doing so.
This Article analyzes the process of making meaning at trial using stories,
with three objectives: to assess the extent to which narrative structure accurately
describes what transpires at trials, to evaluate the effect of narrative on the
reliability of decision making, and to consider aspects of trial design that might
mitigate the bias and error that stories can introduce. Part I questions the
precision of the “story model,” which is a descriptive framework according to
which jurors process testimony by organizing it into competing stories. As a
matter of both cognitive psychology and advocacy within the adversarial sys-
tem, stories are unavoidable. To prohibit them altogether would be both unwork-
able and a form of incremental inquisitorialism. But even though presented with
stories, jurors do not reach verdicts exclusively by referring to narratives. The
Article concludes that trials can best be understood as a hybrid of subjective and
objective approaches to the interpretation of facts, and therefore that opportuni-
ties exist to increase analytic processing. In Part II, the Article addresses
whether evidence that does take shape through familiar stories detracts from the
accuracy of trial outcomes. There are various ways in which the truth-seeking
goals of trial and essential characteristics of stories conﬂict. Narrative’s indiffer-
ence to objective facts, its invitation to readers to construct parts of the tale, and
the expectations it raises for the sequence, signiﬁcance, and coherence of
evidence all risk distortions in fact-ﬁnding. Misconceptions arise in part from
the intuitive and sometimes emotional decision-making jurors use to ﬁll per-
ceived gaps in evidence.
None of this is to say, however, that narrative and truth seeking are irreconcil-
able, or that narrative is a pernicious force. Rather, it is to recognize that there
are points at which particular types of stories can override doubts, even though
those doubts, considered dispassionately, have a stronger basis in the evidence,
and that decision makers in the criminal justice system may be ill-equipped to
follow particular rules and instructions as a result. Part III thus considers
whether trial mechanics—from discovery obligations through appellate review
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of evidentiary errors—might counterweigh certain kinds of narrative bias. In
particular, narrative theory exposes the false assumptions within limiting instruc-
tions that testimony can be “unsaid” or that any piece of evidence admitted or
excluded in error can be considered in isolation. Acknowledging this ﬁction,
confronting the challenges of deliberately disregarding evidence in delibera-
tions, explaining the rationales for exclusion, and framing the issues before the
jury hears prejudicial information could all increase the reliability of verdicts.
I. ARE TRIALS “NARRATIVES”?
A. NARRATIVE THEORY AND THE LAW
Narrative theory highlights two characteristics of stories that are essential to
understanding how meaning is produced at trial. First, the elements of the story
interact in ways that alter their individual signiﬁcance: each merges with what
came before and ﬂows into what comes after. This idea that no one piece of
evidence can be assessed in isolation, and that new pieces color both the
information already before the jury and the testimony to come, stems from
various deﬁnitions of narrative.27 In Jerome Bruner’s scholarship on folk psychol-
ogy, he explains that the constituent parts of a story have no “life or meaning of
their own” but acquire meaning from “their place in the overall conﬁguration of
the sequence as a whole—its plot or fabula.”28 Kenneth Burke describes
narrative as a “pentad” with the following components: “an Actor, an Action, a
Goal, a Scene, and an Instrument,” plus some “Trouble” that causes an imbal-
ance among the ﬁve elements and must be morally explicated and redressed to
restore balance.29 From the structuralist perspective, Roland Barthes offers a
different taxonomy but with this same sense of collective effect. Narratives, he
theorizes, are composed of “nuclei” or hinge points, “catalysers” that ﬁll
narrative space and connect the hinge points, “informants” to identify the time
and place of the story, and mood-setting “indices.”30
Second, accounts of the basic structure and features of narrative cite its
appeal to preexisting models for human behavior and the inescapable way in
27. The term “stories” ﬁts within the broader category of narrative, which includes various aspects
of the production and reception of stories and generally describes a “collective way of knowing things.”
Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 148 (1997); see also id.
(“[L]aw contains stories and can be categorized as narrative . . . .”).
28. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 43 (1990). Narrative, Bruner further explains, has the
“principal property” of “inherent sequentiality” and is “a unique sequence of events, mental states,
happenings involving human beings as characters or actors.” Id.; see also ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM &
JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 113–14 (2000) (describing the unfolding of narrative plot from
steady state, to disruption by trouble, to efforts at redress, to restoration of a steady state, followed by
the moral of the story).
29. BRUNER, supra note 28, at 50; see also KENNETH BURKE, A GRAMMAR OF MOTIVES (1954)
(detailing the ﬁve components, originally referred to as “act,” “agent,” “agency,” “scene,” and “pur-
pose”).
30. ROLAND BARTHES, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives, in IMAGE—MUSIC—TEXT
79, 92–96 (Stephen Heath trans., 1977).
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which assumed facts and structures supplement given information. Paradigms
exercise a “grip on the human imagination”31 and therefore guide and inﬂuence
the reception of evidence as well. They recur so frequently in stories that
familiar elements can enact them implicitly. These embedded forms are charac-
terized in Steven Winter’s scholarship on narrative as “observed prototype
effects” that take shape as “frames, scripts, schemas, scenarios, stock stories,
and idealized cognitive models.”32 Stephen King articulates a similar idea from
the craftsman’s viewpoint. Stories, one of his characters states, should all
include a “musta-been” or an obvious solution to the unknown piece of the story
that in turn makes the reader “tell himself a story.”33
Stories, of course, are an ancient—even preliterate—form of communication,
and the reference to narrative structure as a guide to interpreting human
experience has a long provenance.34 As Joan Didion stated, “[w]e tell ourselves
stories in order to live.”35 There is an old question whether narrative is structure
or substance—that is, whether it serves as a means of describing experience or
constitutes the experience itself. Scholars from many disciplines have con-
cluded that events have a narrative character “all the way down.”36 Philosopher
David Carr writes that “no elements enter our experience . . . unstoried or
unnarrativized.”37 And literary theorist Barbara Hardy observes that “we dream
in narrative, daydream in narrative, remember, anticipate, hope, despair, believe,
doubt, plan, revise, criticize, construct, gossip, learn, hate, and love by narra-
tive.”38 Legal academics have also suggested that narrative is preconceptual,
and that it inﬂuences not just how facts are perceived but what facts are,
31. BRUNER, supra note 28.
32. STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 87 (2001) (citing Gerald P.
Lo´pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6 (1984) (“Once the principal features of a given phe-
nomenon suggest a particular stock structure, that structure shapes our expectations and responses
. . . resolv[ing] ambiguity and complement[ing] ‘given’ information with much ‘assumed’ informa-
tion.”)).
33. STEPHEN KING, THE COLORADO KID 46–47 (2005). King also writes that stories have “a beginning,
a middle, and an end,” a “through-line,” and a single unknown fact. Id. at 158, 173.
34. See, e.g., PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 288, 292 (John B. Thompson
ed., trans., 1981).
35. JOAN DIDION, THE WHITE ALBUM 11 (1979).
36. See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 222 (1999) (citing literary theorists, historians, and
philosophers who share the view that “narrative forms the deep structure of human action” and
asserting that “the bedrock of human events is not a mere sequence upon which narrative is imposed
but a conﬁgured sequence that has a narrative character all the way down” (footnote omitted)).
37. DAVID CARR, TIME, NARRATIVE, AND HISTORY 68 (1986); see also id. at 176–77 (contrasting the
work of analytical philosophers who argue that “narrative is merely the literary surface, the manner in
which historians write up the results of their research, which is really incidental to the scientiﬁc work of
discovery or reconstruction”).
38. Barbara Hardy, Towards a Poetics of Fiction: 3) An Approach Through Narrative, 2 NOVEL: A
FORUM ON FICTION 5, 5 (1968); see also id. (“In order really to live, we make up stories about ourselves
and others, about the personal as well as the social past and future.”); Theodore R. Sarbin, The
Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology, in NARRATIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE STORIED NATURE OF
HUMAN CONDUCT 3, 11 (Theodore R. Sarbin ed., 1986) (“Our plannings, our rememberings, even our
loving and hating, are guided by narrative plots.”).
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particularly in the criminal justice system.39 In Robert Burns’s scholarship on
trials, he explains that the events adjudicated have narrative structure before
they enter the courtroom: “To act at all is to hold an immediate past in memory,
to anticipate a goal, and to organize means to achieve that goal,”40 and each of
those things corresponds to the “‘beginning, middle, and end’ of a well-
constructed story.”41
This Article does not require one to proceed from the premise that there are
objective, self-announcing “facts in the world” and that an essential function of
adjudication is identifying and labeling them. Obviously, if one takes that
position, then the interplay between narrative and truth becomes a matter of
deep concern.42 The argument here, however, is hospitable to those who ques-
tion whether there are objectively veriﬁable “truths,”43 who recognize the
necessarily internal perspectives of both litigants and fact ﬁnders, and who
39. See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV.
591, 593–96 (1981); see also Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073,
2083–98 (1989) (claiming that rape cases demonstrate that truth is only a property of an account of an
event—for example, the interpretation of consent—and not of the event itself). For a discussion on the
way in which stories reach the unconscious and inﬂuence perception, see also AMSTERDAM & BRUNER,
supra note 28, at 116.
40. BURNS, supra note 36 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. (quoting CARR, supra note 37, at 48).
42. As Catharine MacKinnon asserts, the operation of legal institutions assumes some facts exist to
be found. She writes:
This may be embarrassingly non-postmodern, but reality exists. Of this the law, at least, has
no doubt. Something happened or will be found to have happened. You can still be tried for
perjury even though there supposedly is no truth. You can still be sued for libel, so somewhere
reality exists to be falsiﬁed.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Law’s Stories as Reality and Politics, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 232, 235 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). Epistemologist Susan Haack
similarly argues that the accuracy of expert testimony has consequences:
[I]t really matters whether this witness’s recovered memory of an alleged crime is genuine,
whether this is the person who committed the crime, whether this plaintiff’s injury was caused
by a defect in this manufacturer’s tire or seat-belt buckle or lawn-chair, whether this was the
chemical exposure that caused or promoted the plaintiff’s cancer, and so on.
Susan Haack, What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in Legal Epistemology, 38
SETON HALL L. REV. 1053, 1053–54 (2008). Of course, as other theorists have observed, the reality that
exists is not “already out there now real” and accessible by “taking a look,” but co-constituted by the
cognitive processes brought to bear, including the production of legal truth. BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN,
INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 251, 424–25 (1957).
43. “[S]ome truths are made true by things we do,” Susan Haack observes, “and others by what we
believe; and some truths make sense only relativized to a time, a place, or a culture. . . . Truths come in
all shapes and sizes; and much of the time we trafﬁc in the almost, the approximately, or the partially
true.” Susan Haack, The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth, 32 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 20, 21–22
(2008); see also STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 344 (1989) (asserting that “questions of fact, truth, correctness,
validity, and clarity can neither be posed nor answered in reference to some extracontextual, ahistorical,
nonsituational reality, or rule, or law, or value”). But see THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 5
(1986) (suggesting that it is essential to strive for objective truth to “detach gradually from the
contingencies of the self” even while recognizing that objectivity is not purely attainable).
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struggle with the vexed idea of the subject itself.44 More importantly, even
taking a world of brute and unmediated facts as a given, the world of trials deals
with “legal truth,” a very different concept. The goals of trial are more complex
than ﬁnding facts or discovering “the truth.”45 Trials express concerns about
procedural fairness, about constitutional protections for privacy, about privi-
leged relationships, about power disparities between the state and citizens,
about the differential costs of error in innocent and guilty verdicts, and so on.
These concerns may lead to denying the fact ﬁnder evidence that is clearly
relevant to the question of the factual truth of an allegation. Exclusionary rules,
for example, can bar even the most probative physical evidence or most
heartfelt confession if it is unconstitutionally obtained. And the broad concerns
of trials may dictate that the correct verdict, the legal truth, is that a defendant is
“not guilty” even when, as a factual matter, he may have possessed the drugs he
is accused of possessing or poisoned his wife. One can care deeply about legal
truth, be personally convinced the defendant committed the crime, and think
that, if the prosecution has not met its burden of proof, the right result is that the
defendant be found not guilty.
To say all this is not to omit the importance of factual accuracy. As the
increasing exonerations of wrongfully convicted defendants emphasize, there
are correct and incorrect outcomes.46 A common refrain in both cases and
commentary is that “truth about allegations of fact on the basis of evidence” is a
necessary precondition to substantive justice.47 The Supreme Court has often
44. For a particularly incisive description of the postmodern take on the fractured subject, see James
Boyle, Anachronism of the Moral Sentiments? Integrity, Postmodernism, and Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV.
493, 498 (1999) (“The subject dissolves ‘upward’ into the structures that constrain it, and ‘downward’
into the discourses that constitute it . . . [and l]ittle is left other than a gummy biological and geographi-
cal residue.” (footnotes omitted)).
45. See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 3 (2006)
(offering the example of double jeopardy guarantees and pointing out that “[t]he absence of a
mechanism for appealing acquittals is patently not driven by a concern to ﬁnd the truth”); Donald A.
Dripps, The Substance-Procedure Relationship in Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CRIMINAL LAW 409, 415 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) (noting that many familiar legal
doctrines—including “permitting the accused to stand silent at trial”—“appear to deviate from rational-
ist theory” and “testify to the plurality of values at stake in criminal procedure”); Eleanor Swift, Rival
Claims to “Truth,” 49 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 613 (1998) (reviewing the “non-instrumental values and
principles” that justify some evidence rules, including liberty, autonomy, and privacy); see also JEFFREY
ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 99 (1994) (discussing the
jury’s broader role in reinforcing democratic principles).
46. See generally, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Michael Shaffer, Exonerations in the United States,
1989–2012 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 277, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract2092195.
47. WILLIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 14 (1985) (stating that “imple-
mentation of substantive laws by the determination of the truth about allegations of fact on the basis of
evidence is a necessary condition of achieving . . . justice under the law”); see 1 JEREMY BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 22 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827) (referring to “Injustice, and
her handmaid Falsehood”); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 239 (1971) (asserting that the rule of law
requires “a process reasonably designed to ascertain the truth, in ways consistent with the other ends of
the legal system, as to whether a violation has taken place and under what circumstances”); see also
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stressed the primary importance of “arriving at the truth in criminal trials.”48
When adjudication produces institutionalized meaning from evidence, factual
accuracy matters and so too does an examination of any constructs and proce-
dures that might inhibit it. Yet, trial process expresses concern about more than
“getting the facts wrong”; an equally weighty problem is “getting the facts
right” through means that are either legally forbidden or procedurally off-limits.
This Article addresses the tension between narrative and both factual and legal
truths.
The relationship described here is a complex one. That there is a connection
between reliable adjudication and the role of stories does not entail a perfect
correlation between curtailing those stories and reducing errors. Weighing the
validity of stories, in a process bounded by careful trial mechanics, may reveal
as much as it distorts. And stories play some practical (and unobjectionable)
parts in the adjudicative process. One function of stories is to provide a starting
point for organizing events. Whether narrative fully constructs or merely de-
scribes reality, literature serves across many settings as what Kenneth Burke
calls “equipment for living.”49 Forms like tragedies and comedies offer labels
for experiences “sufﬁciently representative of our social structure . . . for people
to ‘need a word for it.’”50 The historian and the novelist tend to “share the
narrative form,” which underscores the extent to which narrative offers a pattern
for recounting experiences and events.51 Indeed, as Marianne Wesson writes,
“[e]very lawsuit begins and ends as a story.”52
Moreover, narrative does a great deal of work in the legal context apart from
ordering events. It provides both a compelling form for legal advocacy and an
underlying structure for judicial decisions.53 Legal processes not only reﬂect,
LAUDAN, supra note 45, at 2 (“Truth, while no guarantee of justice, is an essential precondition for it.”);
H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the
Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 846 (1982) (“[E]vidence remains alive in American legal parlance
and thought because the rules express some usable ideas about one of the main concerns of the lawyer:
the establishment of a fact as true.”).
48. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980); accord Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
425 (1979) (“[T]he function of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.”); Tehan v.
United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (“The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth.”).
49. KENNETH BURKE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERARY FORM 293 (3d ed. 1973); cf. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984) (noting the temporal and moral ordering that
characterizes narratives and enables people to account for experiences).
50. BURKE, supra note 49, at 300; see also JAMES A. HERRICK, THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF RHETORIC
222 (3d ed. 2005) (explaining that rhetoric provides a “means of understanding and living successfully
in a world of symbols”).
51. BRUNER, supra note 28, at 45.
52. Marianne Wesson, “Particular Intentions”: The Hillmon Case and the Supreme Court, 18 LAW
& LIT. 343, 343 (2006).
53. See Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions—Does the Law Need a Narratology?, 18 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1, 6–17, 22–25 (2006) (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)) (giving
examples of courts engaging in the construction and communication of narrative); State v. Rusk, 424
A.2d 720 (Md. 1981); Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)); see also id. at 27
(discussing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and that Court’s
effort to ﬁt its opinion into a “master narrative” about what courts do).
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but also create, familiar narratives. Those narratives can, in turn, serve as
sources of continuity in the sense that the events that give rise to litigation, the
testimony in court, and the pronouncement of a verdict all form one story.54 A
quarter century ago, legal scholars began focusing attention on the role of
narrative in the development of precedent and court opinions, as well as law’s
origins in values and principles expressed by classic narratives.55 Robert Cover,
for example, wrote that law itself is derived from the “sacred narratives of our
world.”56 Later scholars introduced new terms to the debate over narrative,
evaluating its role not in supporting but in challenging embedded power struc-
tures.57
These questions about narrative as source material and structural underpin-
ning for law and also as a platform for disenfranchised voices have received
ample scholarly attention. Legal theorists, however, have focused less on the
effect that narrative has on the fact-ﬁnding process itself. Social scientists have
engaged in a descriptive project that demonstrates that jurors make decisions by
evaluating competing narratives. But this idea, often referred to as the “story
model” of adjudication,58 warrants closer consideration in terms of both its
54. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 36, at 224 (“[T]here is no discontinuity between the task of the
proper characterization of the past act and the implicit story the jury is telling about itself and its society
in the present.”).
55. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: AMISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 269 (1988) (discussing
the language of judicial opinions). See generally, e.g., JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, RULES
VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (1990) (exploring lay litigants’ experi-
ences in small claims courts); L.H. LARUE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS FICTION: NARRATIVE IN THE RHETORIC
OF AUTHORITY (1995) (focusing on major Supreme Court opinions); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry,
Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (analyzing
the issue in legal scholarship); Sandra Day O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Inﬂuence of a
Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217 (1992) (discussing Justice Marshall’s use of narrative to make legal
arguments to his colleagues).
56. Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179, 180
(1985); cf. MILNER S. BALL, CALLED BY STORIES: BIBLICAL SAGAS AND THEIR CHALLENGE FOR LAW 36
(2000) (theorizing that stories “nurture . . . the discernment of guiding presences between the lines of
legal texts and between the facts of situations”); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 (1983) (deﬁning narratives as “the trajectories
plotted upon material reality by our imaginations” and identifying their central role in giving meaning
to legal texts and prescriptions).
57. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-
Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241, 1268 n.126 (1993) (stating that “personal
narrative . . . developed in response to the exclusion of the disempowered from mainstream academic
discourse”); see also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 1028 (1991)
(describing how feminist narrative theory demonstrates ways of knowing “that may not be generated
or validated by scientiﬁc objectivity”); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others:
A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412–15 (1989) (maintaining that narratives and counter
narratives provide a means for understanding differing pictures of events, especially those concerning
disenfranchised minorities). See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW:
CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (1976) (advocating a person-
centered approach to the law through critical retellings of notable cases in which judges “masked” the
human story).
58. Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie coined the phrase. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A
Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 542 (1991)
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explanatory power and its relationship to the epistemic competence of trials.
B. THE STORY MODEL OF ADJUDICATION
A ﬁrst step in evaluating the relationship between the story form and legal
and factual accuracy is to determine the extent to which trials actually constitute
narratives that jurors “read” before rendering their verdicts. Trials themselves
are a hybrid with elements like the rehearsal of competing narratives that begins
with voir dire; the story telling that takes place in opening statements; the more
disciplined narrative of eliciting testimony on direct examination; and the more
“logical” or argumentative approaches of cross-examinations and closing argu-
ments. A more complex question involves how decisions are then reached at
trial. The conventional view of fact ﬁnders’ approach to deciding “what hap-
pened” is a rationalist one.59 According to this tradition in evidence theory, the
process of proof is deductive and logical relevance links the evidence intro-
duced to the facts in issue.60 One “rational” path to resolution is simply
determining which side of the case has weightier evidence overall,61 and
another is the integrated processing of Bayesian analysis, which involves
making probability assessments and then updating them in light of newly
acquired evidence.62 The law of evidence thus rests primarily on theories of
knowledge that purport to give an account of accuracy in other-than-narrative
[hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory] (reporting that sequences of available evidence
were less compelling to mock jurors than cases presented in narrative form); see also Nancy Penning-
ton & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192, 192–221 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie,
Story Model].
59. See 5 BENTHAM, supra note 47 (“If there be one business that belongs to a jury more particularly
than another, it is, one should think, the judging of the probability of evidence.”); see also WILLIAM
TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 71 (1990) (asserting that the rationalist approach
has dominated evidence scholarship since the eighteenth century); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits
of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 366 (1978) (describing the “burden of rationality” in adjudica-
tion); D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review
of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281, 1283–84 (2004) (describing the truth-seeking
model of trials); Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 995, 996 (1994) (noting that most evidence scholars accept as a premise the rationalist belief
that “the overarching function of evidence law” is to maximize the probability that fact ﬁnders “will
accurately determine objective historical truth”).
60. See George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689, 690 (1941).
61. See generally, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738 (2012) (critiquing
conventional thinking about the burden of proof according to probabilistic conceptions).
62. See Kenworthey Bilz, We Don’t Want To Hear It: Psychology, Literature and the Narrative
Model of Judging, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 429, 435 (explaining that, in a Bayesian model, “the order in
which one presents evidence should not matter, emotion on the part of decision makers tends to
introduce error (because emotion cannot shift the probabilities of objective facts), and decision makers
should come to their conclusions by estimating the likelihood of their objective truth”); Stephen E.
Feinberg & Mark J. Schervish, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Statistical
Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV. 771, 773 (1986) (deﬁning the Bayesian
approach as “a framework for quantifying uncertainty and methods for revising uncertainty measures in
the light of acquired evidence”); Richard D. Friedman, Commentary, A Presumption of Innocence, Not
of Even Odds, 52 STAN. L. REV. 873, 875 (2000) (describing Bayesian analysis).
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terms. Versions of probability analysis pervade the rules of evidence them-
selves, which provide that evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and that fact
“is of consequence in determining the action.”63 Furthermore, judges often
profess rationality and objectivity when making ﬁndings in opinions.64
Developments in cognitive psychology, however, pose a challenge to the
objectivist account. Experimental research has yielded the insight that jurors do
not, by and large, estimate probabilities when determining the events that
transpired in a case; rather, they draw conclusions based on whether information
assembles into plausible narratives.65 Narrative provides a deep structure inside
the courtroom just as it does outside of it, not only so that triers of fact can
“organize and reorganize large amounts of constantly changing information,”
but also so that they can decide what it means.66 In order to reach a verdict,
jurors construct a story, learn of their decision alternatives and the “verdict
category attributes,” and then classify the story “into the best ﬁtting verdict
category.”67 At this last step—the selection of the “best” account—jurors rely
on coverage (whether the story can accommodate all the evidence), coherence
(whether the story makes sense), and uniqueness (whether there are other
plausible explanations).68
More recent models of jury decision making, such as plausibility theory,
clarify that “legal fact ﬁnding involves a determination of the comparative
plausibility of the parties’ explanations offered at trial rather than a determina-
tion of whether discrete elements are found to a speciﬁc probability.”69 Michael
Pardo and Ronald Allen, for example, critique the Bayesian approach and
develop an “explanation-based account.”70 In their version, jurors interpret and
63. FED. R. EVID. 401.
64. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, Essay, On “I Know It When I See It,” 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1042 (1996)
(describing judicial opinions as “marked by a rhetoric of certainty, inevitability, and claimed objec-
tivity”); Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 865 (1988)
(observing that judicial opinions generally “depict the process of reasoning as a logical deduction”).
65. See, e.g., Keith J. Holyoak & Dan Simon, Bidirectional Reasoning in Decision Making by
Constraint Satisfaction, 128 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 3, 24 (1999); Dan Simon, A Third View of
the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 513 (2004);
see also Samuel R. Gross, Make-Believe: The Rules Excluding Evidence of Character and Liability
Insurance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 852 (1998) (“By now, it is commonplace that most successful
courtroom advocacy is structured as storytelling rather than logical proof.”).
66. W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE
AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 8–10 (1981) (noting that information at trial is presented through
“conﬂicting testimony,” “disorienting time lapses,” multiple perspectives, and a “confusing array of
subplots”).
67. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 58, at 521.
68. Reid Hastie & Nancy Pennington, The O.J. Simpson Stories: Behavioral Scientists’ Reﬂections
on The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 957, 960–61
(1996).
69. Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 VA. L.
REV. 1491, 1527–28 (2001).
70. Michael S. Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL.
223, 225 (2008). There is another interesting echo of the “plausibility” version of the story model in
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weigh evidence to comport with the most coherent theory of the case, using an
“abductive reasoning process of inference to the best explanation.”71 Rather
than determining, based on probability, how likely propositions appear, decision
makers reverse the inferential process and consider whether propositions, if
true, offer the best explanation for the evidence as a whole. This explanatory
model ampliﬁes and amends the descriptive contribution of the story model. It
suggests that decision makers identify potential explanations for evidence and
then determine whether those explanations are better or worse compared to the
available alternatives. Instead of drawing conclusions based on how likely
propositions appear as evidence accumulates, as in Bayesian updating, decision
makers draw inferences based on how well each possible account, if true, would
explain the evidence. In other words, the question in the Jensen case was not
whether Julie’s letter made her murder more or less probable, but whether
murder or suicide better explained the curious combination of evidence, includ-
ing the letter.
Both the story model and this plausibility theory describe jurors as consider-
ing evidence holistically rather than weighing each piece in terms of whether it
is logically tied to speciﬁc issues. And both theories contemplate that jurors will
draw upon their own backgrounds to construct and evaluate explanations for the
evidence.72 When stories conﬂict and jurors must privilege one to reach a
verdict, they do not rely only on “case-speciﬁc information acquired during the
trial,” but also on their experience and values and on “generic expectations
about what makes a complete story.”73 Triers of fact look for a story that both
“has all of its parts” and corresponds to their “knowledge about what typically
happens in the world.”74
Although these holistic conceptions of the adjudicative process make only a
the recent decisions concerning pleading standards in civil cases. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that
allegations in a complaint must cross the line “between possibility and plausibility” in order to survive
a motion to dismiss. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 557. This suggests that a complaint has to present a
version of the relevant events that the jury will accept as the “best available explanation.” See Michael
S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Uniﬁed Theory of Civil Litigation, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1451,
1455 (2010).
71. Pardo & Allen, supra note 70, at 226. By “abductive,” Pardo and Allen mean inference “from a
given effect (the premise) to a causal proposition (the conclusion) that would explain, or best explain,
that effect.” Id at 228. In some respects, Pardo and Allen’s analysis closely tracks the story model. They
state, for example, that an explanation is “better to the extent that it is consistent, simpler, explains more
and different types of facts (consilience), better accords with background beliefs (coherence), is less
ad hoc, and so on.” Id. at 230 (footnote omitted).
72. See, e.g., Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions:
Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity
and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 681 (2000) (“The activation of
trial-relevant schemas appears to have a powerful effect on verdict choice because of jurors’ reliance on
‘commonsense justice.’”).
73. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 58, at 522.
74. Id. at 528.
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few appearances in legal theory,75 they have surfaced in cases concerning the
admissibility of evidence. The 1997 Old Chief decision76—among the canonical
decisions in modern evidence law—discusses the importance of narrative rich-
ness and each side’s opportunity to shape the moral force of its case. Johnny
Lynn Old Chief was charged with being a felon in possession of a ﬁrearm. The
government sought to prove the element that Old Chief was a felon by introduc-
ing a record of his prior conviction for an assault that caused serious bodily
injury. Old Chief offered to stipulate that he had a qualifying prior felony but
moved to exclude any evidence of its violent nature. The Court concluded, in a
5–4 decision authored by Justice Souter, that the government could be com-
pelled to stipulate to the underlying felony because the violent nature of the
prior offense would unduly prejudice the jury against Old Chief. The Court
limited its holding, however, by simultaneously advancing an expansive under-
standing of probative value. According to the Court’s analysis, evidence has
“force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning” and may help to tell “a colorful
story with descriptive richness.”77 Echoes of the story model sound in the
Court’s statement that the government can only meet its burden if it satisﬁes
juror “expectations about what proper proof should be.”78 The Court was
mindful, as well, of the collective impact of evidence and the overarching
narrative that litigants may need to present. In that vein, the Court wrote that the
government
may fairly seek to place its evidence before the jurors, as much to tell a story
of guiltiness as to support an inference of guilt, to convince the jurors that a
guilty verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to point to the discrete
elements of a defendant’s legal fault.79
Both key elements of narrative theory emerge from the Old Chief opinion: that
jurors have preexisting conceptions about stories that affect how they process
evidence, and that individual pieces of evidence interact with each other in ways
that inﬂuence meaning.
The Court’s evocative language and rejection of an atomistic view of trial
enlarged the arguments for admitting evidence. The case represents perhaps the
only facet of evidence law expressly concerned with decreasing jurors’ detach-
ment. The lower courts have cited Old Chief when reasoning that the jury
“properly weighs fact questions in the context of a coherent picture of the way
the world works” and that “[u]nduly sterilizing a party’s trial presentation can
75. Robert Burns’s many descriptions of the narrative quality of events at trial and the construction
and deconstruction of stories through testimony and argument are notable exceptions. See, e.g., BURNS,
supra note 36; Robert P. Burns, The Rule of Law in the Trial Court, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 307 (2007).
76. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174–75 (1997).
77. Id. at 187.
78. Id. at 188.
79. Id.
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unfairly hamper her ability to shape a compelling . . . exposition of the facts.”80
In the Jensen case, for example, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Mark
Jensen’s claim that extensive pornography found on his computer was errone-
ously admitted because the court accepted it as part of the “panorama” of
evidence about his abusive relationship with his wife.81 The court reasoned, in
familiar terms, that “[f]or the ﬁnder of fact to arrive at the truth, it was proper
not to limit the evidence to a frame-by-frame presentation.”82 Courts have also
concluded that juries will penalize prosecutors if they neglect to follow “the
natural sequence of narrative evidence,”83 even where the evidence in question
is offered to prove points the defendant has fully admitted.84 And on the defense
side, in a 2010 habeas case, the Seventh Circuit went so far as to suggest that
the failure to present a coherent narrative rises to the level of ineffective
assistance of counsel. In the case of a defendant adjudged “guilty but mentally
ill” in a murder trial, Judge Posner wrote that a narrative richer than the “bare
facts of his bizarre behavior” was necessary to effective representation.85
With respect to other uses of evidence—such as the admission of victim
impact testimony—courts openly embrace the force of narrative. In Payne v.
Tennessee, the Supreme Court held that “a State may properly conclude that for
a jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and blameworthi-
ness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase evidence of the speciﬁc
harm caused by the defendant.”86 The Supreme Court has also noted the
interrelationship between seemingly discrete pieces of evidence; the reasoning
in several cases acknowledges that unfavorable testimony may taint the other
evidence presented. In Bruton v. United States, for instance, the Court con-
cluded that juries cannot disregard codefendant confessions that are formally
admissible only against the confessing defendant, yet incriminating as to others
80. In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenﬂuramine/Dexfenﬂuramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 369 F.3d 293,
314 (3d Cir. 2004); see also, e.g., United States v. McCourt, 468 F.3d 1088, 1091–92 (8th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that Old Chief’s reasoning favored admission of pornographic images even though defen-
dant stipulated that the photographs were of minors).
81. See State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶ 86, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 480, 794 N.W.2d 482, 502 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2010) (“The evidence that Jensen secretly planted pornography around the home gave viability to
the State’s theory of the case that Jensen had been engaging in a campaign of emotional torture toward
Julie up to the time he poisoned her.”).
82. Id.
83. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 189.
84. See United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 871, 876 (7th Cir. 2001); see also United States v.
Walker, 428 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[A] criminal defendant may not ‘stipulate or admit
his way out’ of the full evidentiary force of the case against him.” (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at
186)); United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he government, which has the
burden of proving every element of the crime charged [beyond a reasonable doubt], must have the
freedom to decide how to discharge that burden.”).
85. Wilson v. Gaetz, 608 F.3d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 2010); cf. United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747,
753–54 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to decline to
order discovery of government evidence that might have supported a compelling story about alternative
perpetrators in a drug trafﬁcking case).
86. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
296 [Vol. 101:281THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
in a joint trial.87 Confronted with powerful testimony about a damaging confes-
sion that is consistent with the story offered by the prosecution, the Court stated
that jurors would ﬁnd it impossible to “segregate evidence into separate intellec-
tual boxes” and set this piece of it aside.88
Of course, long before experimental psychologists documented its effects or
courts began to reason both implicitly and explicitly from narrative theory,
advocates had recognized how potent stories can be. Narrative has long inﬂu-
enced not only how fact ﬁnders respond to arguments but the way in which
litigants shape their appeals in the ﬁrst place. Many experienced trial lawyers
begin their opening statements with some version of the phrase: “This is a case
about . . . .” In a criminal fraud case, that sentence might end with “theft” or
“lies” or “greed”; in a toxic tort case, the theme might be something like
“poisoning.” Trial strategy typically involves communicating that theme when
presenting evidence and following the thread all the way to closing argument.
As Robert Weisberg writes, “[i]t would hardly shock lawyers who lived before
the era of high critical theory in American academia to discover that the winner
in some trials is the more sophisticated or compelling storyteller.”89 The trial
advocacy literature includes both implicit and explicit references to narrative
theory, with terms that closely track its core insights. Practitioners are advised
that jurors recreate events “through their own stimulated imagination.”90 Some
contemporary practice guides also reveal awareness of cognitive models and
reference the “rules of narrative” that jurors have “learned through a lifetime of
exposure to stories.”91 “Good lawyers,” one such manual states, tie the circum-
stances of the case to “plotlines already deeply embedded in listeners’ minds, to
87. 391 U.S. 123, 135–36 (1968).
88. Id. at 131 (citation omitted); cf. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 706 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“Evidence is not introduced in a vacuum; rather, it is built upon.” (quoting Daniel J. Capra,
Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and
Retrospective Review, 53 FORD. L. REV. 391, 412 (1984))).
89. Robert Weisberg, Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses, in LAW’S STORIES,
supra note 42, at 61–64. Steven Lubet puts it succinctly: “[T]he party who succeeds in telling the most
persuasive story should win.” STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIALADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 1 (2d ed.
1997).
90. JAMES W. JEANS, SR., TRIAL ADVOCACY § 10.1, at 305 (2d ed. 1993); cf. BURNS, supra note 36, at
164 (explaining that stories become “suitors for the jury’s imagination”); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC
JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 75 (1995) (noting how literature can stimulate the
moral imagination and arouse empathy); Delgado, supra note 57, at 2415 (stating that stories “stir
imagination in ways . . . conventional discourse cannot”).
91. See RICHARD D. RIEKE & RANDALL K. STUTMAN, COMMUNICATION IN LEGAL ADVOCACY 47–48
(1990) (asserting that jurors employ stories when “asked to make sense of the complexities with which
they are presented” rather than doing so “by inherent human rationality or by being exposed to a
reconstruction of reality”); see also, e.g., THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 26 (8th ed. 2010) (“If
lawyers do not organize the evidence into a clear, simple story, jurors will do so on their own.”); SAM
SCHRAGER, THE TRIAL LAWYER’S ART 210 (1999) (“Lawyers reach for drama, metaphor, voice, gesture,
persona, myth, and other expressive resources of the storyteller’s art to give authority to their
accounts.”); MICHAEL E. TIGAR, NINE PRINCIPLES OF LITIGATION AND LIFE 99 (2009) (“The story is actually
built up from the testimony—the personal experiences—of witnesses, who bring us their version of
what happened and their sense of the justice or injustice of it.”); RONALD WAICUKAUSKI ET AL., THE
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mythic narratives whose familiar moves reveal how the world is and how
people, faced with fateful choices, act for good or for ill.”92
C. A HYBRID OF SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE PROCESSES
Although advocates instinctively make use of stories and courts increasingly
recognize their interaction with the rules of evidence, the transition to a
narrative conception of trials has occurred without a thorough analysis of either
its descriptive accuracy or its normative ﬁt with the aims of trial. Empirical
social scientists now widely accept the story model of decision making under
uncertainty in the adversary system, but evidence scholarship itself continues to
devote more attention to probability than to narrative theory and to maintain a
distinction between the two even when probability determinations themselves
cannot be severed altogether from narrative inﬂuences.93 For a critical look at
the theory of trial narratives, one has to turn elsewhere. Epistemology, social
cognition, and linguistics all help bring into focus a composite view that merges
different modes of decision making. Trials both construct and are constructed
by stories, but jurors also rely on more empirical sources when processing
evidence. Decision making is neither focused exclusively on probability assess-
ments nor grounded entirely in the identiﬁcation of familiar narratives. As a
result, there are opportunities to leverage analytic processes, to counteract
narrative distortions where appropriate, and to increase accuracy.
Legal epistemology—a ﬁeld that speaks to fundamental questions about the
“empirical adequacy” of adjudication94 and considers the methodology of trial
in terms of whether it is “well engineered to lead to true beliefs about the
world”95—offers a framework that offsets the story model. It suggests that
jurors engage in more than one approach to decision making. While narrative
provides the basic structure for intelligible hypotheses, probability analysis
comes into play when jurors test and weigh those hypotheses. Jurors surely are
not breaking down all of the open questions at trial into discrete probability
assessments, and the claim that they instead organize the information received
into a narrative form is a convincing one. But at the next step, in rendering a
verdict, jurors consider the relative weight of competing narratives and are
attentive not only to how each ﬁts with familiar stories, but also to the
theoretical plausibility of each account and the normative attractiveness of the
practical course of action that it suggests. Jurors take what they hear, combine it
with what they know, and then reach a decision based in part on how they feel.
WINNING ARGUMENT § 6.02, at 87 (2001) (“Telling a story taps into your listener’s conscious and
subconscious processes for receiving and analyzing information and holds the listener’s attention.”).
92. SCHRAGER, supra note 91, at 7.
93. See Pardo & Allen, supra note 70, at 224 & n.2; see also Simon, supra note 65, at 559
(remarking that Bayes Theorem “appears to have attained prominence within mainstream evidence
scholarship”).
94. Allen & Leiter, supra note 69, at 1493.
95. LAUDAN, supra note 45, at 2–3.
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They also, however, seek a measure of formal validity when disentangling
persuasive and unpersuasive narratives. Although jurors ﬁrst assemble stories,
they then engage in a logical evaluation of “which version was more likely to
yield the evidence that has been presented in court, and by how much.”96
Jurors not only draw on more than one mode of understanding, but also
engage in objective and subjective processes at the same time. Cognitive
psychologists hypothesize that systems like the story model can operate to-
gether with more mechanical and hierarchical reasoning grounded in logic and
probability.97 Different computational systems may produce divergent resolu-
tions, but the dual-process framework also contemplates interdependent types of
cognition, interacting and occurring simultaneously.98 Even when an optical or
perceptual illusion has been revealed, for example, a viewer may continue to
see it the same way. “[A] person can be torn,” Steven Sloman explains,
“between descriptions that he or she resonates to and descriptions that he or she
ﬁnds to be analytically more accurate.”99 Descriptions that resonate, as stories
do, can coexist with logic but will frequently override it when there is a conﬂict:
“The associative system . . . always has its opinion heard and, because of its
speed and efﬁciency, often precedes and thus neutralizes the rule-based re-
sponse.”100 Dan Simon has further elaborated on the dual-process theory of
persuasion. In his terms, the theory mediates between the rationalist claim to
objectivity and the realist assertion that legal decisions arise not from logic but
from the “felt necessities of the time.”101 The cognitive processing commonly
termed “System I” involves “emotion, motivation, affect, effort-minimization,
and closure-seeking.”102 “System II processing,” on the other hand, is “analyti-
96. Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a
Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 667 (1991); see also David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary
Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id2029106 (“Nothing about the story model, however—notwith-
standing the general emphasis it places on nonlinear, unconscious, coherence-based modes of reasoning—
requires that jury reasoning be entirely nonlinear or unconscious.”).
97. See Steven A. Sloman, The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL.
3, 6 (1996). Of course, those systems cannot themselves be reduced to pure rule application but require
“theory choice” and the weighing of sometimes incommensurable values. It oversimpliﬁes, as well, to
suggest that formal validity marks the boundary between arguments that produce accurate outcomes
and those that do not. See STEPHEN EDELSTON TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 145 (1958) (“[A]nalytic-
ity is one thing, formal validity is another; and neither of these is a universal criterion of necessity, still
less of the soundness of our arguments.”).
98. See, e.g., Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143, 186
(2011).
99. Sloman, supra note 97, at 19; cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 734 (2012) (“Seeing is always selective, always shaped by context.
Once we see some image . . . we may be unable not to see it.”).
100. Sloman, supra note 97, at 15 (“The force of the evidence is to support not only the conclusion
that people have and use two computationally distinct systems of reasoning but also that the associative
system intrudes on the rule-based one.”).
101. Simon, supra note 65, at 512 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1
(1881)).
102. Simon, supra note 98, at 184 (detailing characteristics of System I processing).
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cal, thorough, and rational.”103 Simon also concurs in Sloman’s ﬁnding that
analytic thinking is “susceptible to being skewed by superﬁcial heuristic process-
ing” in situations of uncertainty.104 System II may dominate cognition when it
comes to straightforward inquiries or easy cases, but many trials raise complex
questions. Doubt and difﬁculty prompt jurors to rely on existing images and
personal experiences, and an unconscious and associative process can thus take
precedence.
The question, then, is whether there are opportunities during a trial when it is
possible and desirable to highlight the risk of instinctive decision making and
encourage more effortful and systematic consideration of the evidence. Poten-
tial counterweights to stories arise, for example, within the jury’s deliberative
process. Generating support for a position ﬁrst arrived at through automatic
processing requires the more considered, System II approach. That move, in
turn, opens a juror’s conclusions to external evaluation and critique. Linguistic
theory further suggests that, in addition to multiple processes coexisting within
jurors, the subjective prompts that come from stories vary across jurors. The
aspiration for a diverse jury, which ﬁnds expression in the cases prohibiting
discriminatory jury selection,105 in part focuses on the introduction of other
perspectives and, with them, other ways of “reading” the story.
Although stories enact preexisting models, those models are not necessarily
the same for everyone. Consequently, the interaction between jurors using
distinct schemas might expose the subjective nature of their assessments.
Linguistics further illuminates the reception of stories because language like-
wise uses image schemas as the basic tools to construct more complex cognitive
models.106 That search for metaphor is how understanding emerges in “domains
where there is no clearly discernible preconceptual structure to our experi-
ence.”107 George Lakoff provides the illustration of “two ways of understanding
electricity—as a continuous ﬂuid that ﬂows like water and as a bunch of elec-
103. Id.; see also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011) (explaining that System
I processing “operates automatically and quickly” while System II “allocates attention to the effortful
mental activities that demand it”); Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing
and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 752
(1980) (distinguishing between systematic “high-involvement” processing and heuristic “low-
involvement” processing).
104. Simon, supra note 98, at 185; see also Simon, supra note 65, at 583–84 (concluding that
“people make decisions through what appears to be a rational-like choice in which a strong alternative
is straightforwardly preferred over its rival” but that the choice is less rational than it seems because it
is driven by an “unconscious cognitive process that reconstructs and transforms difﬁcult and complex
decisions into easy ones by amplifying one alternative and deﬂating the other”).
105. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
106. GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE
MIND (1987) (arguing that cognition depends on metaphor or the mapping of conceptual structures from
one domain to another).
107. Id. at 303. Examples of such metaphors include “Life is a journey” and “Time is a thief.”
See id. at 210, 439; see also GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 47–48 (1980)
(describing various metaphors for the abstract concept of an “idea,” including a being that can
reproduce and die, a plant that can bloom or wither, and a commodity that can be packaged and sold).
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trons that move like people in a crowd;” these are “conﬂicting models, in that
they give different results in a certain range of problems.”108 Lakoff’s prototype
theory parallels the notion that there are multiple perspectives on the facts that
give rise to litigation, and no single, correct method for assessing what is and is
not true. Some abstract concepts, such as hunger and pain, are stable, well-
deﬁned, and widely shared. But subjects vary in terms of how they model
emotions and also important legal concepts like reasonableness, premeditation,
and other states of mind.
Cognitive linguistics suggests as well that, while metaphors have subjective
elements, they correspond to objective facts in the world. The cognitive models
that stories enact are thus not arbitrary ones. Even though they do not exist
outside of a human, conceptual scheme, they also must “work” or “ﬁt.” Steven
Winter advances a similar concept when he argues that intersubjective meaning
is possible because, even though there is no “objective” perspective outside of a
“particular, human conceptual scheme,” there are “reality constraints on what
those conceptual systems can look like” and human cognition has a “grounded,
embodied nature” as a result.109 Idealized cognitive models are themselves
indeterminate constructions but not entirely unbounded ones; they are limited
by other stock practices and broader cultural standards.
Consequently, the story model need not crowd analytical approaches out of
the courtroom. Although narrative helps to organize the experiences and events
conveyed to the jury at trial, the trial itself is not entirely narrative. Subjectivity
coexists with objective processes that can help advance the most basic rule-of-
law principle that “similar cases be treated similarly.”110 Understanding the
possibilities of hybrid decision making provides a starting place for reconsider-
ing trial design. At certain points, nudging fact ﬁnders in the objective direction,
or at least exposing the role that stories play, might produce greater epistemic
competence. Stories can “energize the convictions of right reason,” but the
convictions themselves come from other domains.111 And trial procedure could
encourage jurors to question intuition, examine their own thinking processes,
and privilege analysis grounded in logic when narrative endangers both legal
and factual accuracy.
II. WHAT’S WRONG WITH STORIES?
Before turning to the aspects of trial procedure that intensify the effect of
narrative, the question is why there ought to be any effort to mitigate the power
of stories. If stories are a useful form to communicate and organize information,
108. LAKOFF, supra note 106, at 122.
109. Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2230 n.15 (1989).
110. See RAWLS, supra note 47, at 237.
111. Anthony Kronman, Leontius’ Tale, in LAW’S STORIES, supra note 42, at 54, 56 (“Reason is
needed to guide us, but is incapable of inducing us to follow. It depends on the emotions, and hence on
stories, to help carry us along, to provide the force that moves us to do as reason commands.”).
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how does choosing the “best” one imperil a correct verdict? By and large, jurors
are regarded as capable at the basic task of processing the story of “what
happened” in a given case.112 They are likewise adept at discrediting witnesses
who too obviously rely on a “good story” with a tidy narrative arc and careful
editing. But the story model and all that it contains may compromise the
integrity of fact-ﬁnding in close cases.113 Criminal adjudication, moreover, is
often much more than a question about “what happened” in terms of exterior
facts. Difﬁcult and contested cases, especially in the white collar arena, often
turn on “why” something happened, and what the defendant was thinking when
it did. Mental state determinations are particularly reliant on narrative constructs
and, thus, especially susceptible to their shortcomings as well.114
The story model, as set forth by empirical psychologists, is purely descrip-
tive; it reveals only that there may be blueprints from which decision makers
work in the adjudicative process. Narrative theory enlarges the model by
explaining where those schemas come from and identifying some of their
elements. But to the extent that the story model does accurately describe a
structure for juror decision making, it also gives rise to normative concerns
about content in terms of the deceptive power of narrative. If fact ﬁnders
process information in terms of stories rather than logic, then they are predis-
posed to some misleading elements from familiar plots. Trials purposefully
leave gaps, and story telling inspires jurors to ﬁll those spaces. Simultaneously,
the narrative form raises expectations: for the signiﬁcance of each piece of
evidence, for a certain sequence and completeness to the tale, and for closure at
the end. The implicit invitation for jurors to participate in constructing facts,
combined with the missing narrative components, can introduce bias and lead to
error.
A. INDIFFERENCE TO FACTS AND FALSEHOOD
To begin with, narrative power stems from formal authenticity rather than
substantive accuracy. Stories, as with other art forms, have the capacity to
reveal truth and to demonstrate what most likely happened, but they also lack
the discipline of the argumentative devices that tend to shape the law. They are,
to some extent, indifferent to truth (in the sense of historical facts) or false-
hood; both “real” and “imaginary” stories compel.115 A story, of course, is not
necessarily false or ﬁctional, but it is governed by convention rather than
112. See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 346 (2007) (“After
evaluating all of the evidence, our verdict is strongly in favor of the American jury.”).
113. See Simon, supra note 98, at 147–48 (observing that the “difﬁcult cases, in which the evidence
is more complex, less obvious, and relies heavily on human testimony” are the ones that “put the
diagnostic capabilities of the trial to the test”).
114. See Samuel W. Buell & Lisa Kern Grifﬁn, On the Mental State of Consciousness of Wrong-
doing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 153 (2012).
115. See BRUNER, supra note 28, at 44 (stating that the story form emphasizes the “sequence of . . .
sentences, rather than the truth or falsity of any of those sentences”); see also AMSTERDAM & BRUNER,
supra note 28, at 113 (“A narrative can purport to be either a ﬁction or a real account of events; it does
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“empirical veriﬁcation and logical requiredness.”116 The most successful stories—
with the greatest utility to litigants—also comport with facts in the world. But
the structural adequacy of a story drives its appeal. Journalist Janet Malcolm
captures this when she writes that “truth is messy, incoherent, aimless, boring,
absurd . . . [it] does not make a good story; that’s why we have art.”117
Both the overt story telling at trial and the way in which even expert tes-
timony and scientiﬁc evidence unfolds within the narrative structure of a trial
raise again the vexing question whether the process reﬂects or constructs the
facts.118 This notion dates back to Aristotle’s mimetic theory and the idea that
stories do not produce copies of facts but instead “an aspect of reality that is not
visible outside the artistic representation.”119 The metaphor that emerges is a
“new reading”120 and a mere “version of reality” that “can only achieve
not have to specify which.”). Bennett and Feldman explain that the primary integrity of stories is
structural rather than substantive, as follows:
Although it is doubtful that completely undocumented stories will be believed in many
instances, it is quite possible that adequately documented but poorly structured accounts will
be rejected because they do not withstand careful scrutiny within a story framework. Simi-
larly, a well-constructed story may sway judgments even when evidence is in short supply.
BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 66, at 67–68. But see Simon, supra note 98, at 187 (ﬁnding “reason to
believe that, in reality, truthful evidence is more likely to produce a good narrative than untruthful
evidence”).
116. Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 4–5 (1991); see
also LARUE, supra note 55, at 56, 121 (distinguishing historical fact and ﬁction from the artistic truth or
falsehood of a story). But see HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 483 (Garret Barden & John
Cummin eds., 1975) (2d ed. 1965).
117. JANET MALCOLM, THE CRIME OF SHEILA MCGOUGH 26 (1999).
118. For an excellent discussion of a legal narrative that constructs reality, see Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identiﬁcation Evidence and the Judicial Construction
of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723 (2001). Mnookin challenges the “bedrock assumption of most
commentators on expert evidence, that reliability is exogenous to law, . . . [and] that when judges make
determinations about the validity and reliability of expert evidence, they are ratifying something that
either exists or does not exist out in the world.” Id. at 1729. Judicial determinations themselves, she
argues, “play an enormous role in constructing broader cultural perceptions of reliability.” Id. Judges
thus do more than “simply certify a reliable technique;” they help “shape the form taken by the
technique, and their decisions and their dicta help[] create its authority.” Id. at 1742.
119. BURNS, supra note 36, at 234; see also ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL
38–39 (2009) (“The trial shows us the meaning of the situation in a way that would be invisible without
its methods, yet once we have experienced the trial, we cannot see the situation other than in the light
the trial has shed.”). For contemporary literary expressions of this concept, see, for example, TIM
O’BRIEN, Good Form, in THE THINGS THEY CARRIED 171, 171 (1990) (“[S]tory-truth is truer sometimes
than happening-truth.”) and LORRIE MOORE, People Like That Are the Only People Here: Canonical
Babbling in Peed Onk, in BIRDS OF AMERICA 212, 237 (1998) (“The trip and the story of the trip are
always two different things. . . . One cannot go to a place and speak of it; one cannot both see and say,
not really.”).
120. RICOEUR, supra note 34, at 292–93 (discussing the idea of mimesis and “the narrative func-
tion”); see also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
173 (1983) (suggesting that legal facts “are not merely things found lying about in the world and
carried bodily into court, show-and-tell style, but close-edited diagrams of reality the matching process
itself produces”).
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‘verisimilitude.’”121
Narrative’s characteristic emphasis on form over substance may be incompat-
ible with the essential object of trial. Even in the midst of the invitation to
narrative richness in Old Chief, Justice Souter also wrote that verdicts must ﬁrst
and foremost be “honest.”122 Trials are still fundamentally about discovering
historical truth.123 However, the judicial process does systematically tolerate
some discord between the actual truth of the events giving rise to litigation and
the legal truth of a verdict. The former involves the “true/false verdict di-
chotomy,” which is settled “by comparing it with the facts,” whereas the latter’s
“valid/invalid distinction” is settled “by comparing it with the evidence pre-
sented at trial, [and] asking whether that evidence meets the applicable standard
of proof.”124 According to Larry Laudan’s analysis, “[i]t is crucial to see that the
valid/invalid distinction does not map neatly onto the true/false verdict di-
chotomy.”125 Courts have acknowledged that no trial can uncover “the total
truth in all its mystery,”126 and it is clear that “[b]eing found guilty” and “being
guilty” are not the same thing.127 But the justice system also aspires to align
121. Bruner, supra note 116, at 4; see also BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 66, at 33 (“Judgments
based on story construction are, in many important respects, unveriﬁable in terms of the reality of the
situation that the story represents.”); cf. id. at 6 (“People who cannot manipulate symbols within a
narrative format may be at a disadvantage even when, as witnesses or defendants, they are telling the
truth.”); SCHRAGER, supra note 91, at 5 (“The need to be believable to jurors pushes lawyers well
beyond giving a straightforward presentation of evidence. It forces them to try to create the appearance
of truth.”). But cf. STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH: WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON’T, CAN’T, AND
SHOULDN’T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRUTH 2 (2001) (“A conscientious attorney fashions a story not to
hide or distort the truth, but rather to enable a client to come closer to the truth.”).
122. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997); see also, e.g., Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U.S. 430, 450 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“From the time an accused is ﬁrst suspected to the time
the decision on guilt or innocence is made, our criminal justice system is designed to enable the trier of
fact to discover that truth according to law.”).
123. See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, Essay, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing
Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 777 (1993) (“As a practical matter, we have no better way to
discover the historical truth underlying a case than the trial process itself.”).
124. LAUDAN, supra note 45, at 13.
125. Id. Laudan maintains a clear distinction between the outcome of the trial and the facts of a case
or between the “validity of a verdict” and its truth. See id. at 11–12 (claiming that, “while what is
presented in evidence surely shapes the jury’s verdict, that evidence does not deﬁne what is true and
false about the crime”). This tension plays out as well in the ﬁlm A Civil Action, when the main
character laments the constraints of the trial and objects that the court’s instructions are asking the jury
to “create a ﬁction that will stand for the truth, but won’t be the truth.” A CIVIL ACTION (Touchstone
Pictures 1998).
126. United States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 946 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (calling trials “a carefully
constructed and sanitized version of life” and a “kind of two dimensional cartoon rendition of the three
dimensional world” that only allows “decision of narrow issues of fact and law within the limitations of
a moderately effective litigation system”); see also AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 28, at 118 (“The
outcomes of adjudication, given the specialized nature of adversarial storytelling and the limited
choices that emerge from it, are a bit too pat.”); GEERTZ, supra note 120, at 173 (“[W]hatever it is that
the law is after it is not the whole story.”).
127. LAUDAN, supra note 45, at 12. Laudan distinguishes the guilt of committing the crime from the
guilt of legal condemnation. He calls the ﬁrst “material guilt” and the second “probatory guilt.” Id.; see
also Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal
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truth and legal truth as closely as possible when it publicly announces what
occurred. Stories have no such aspiration.
B. MANAGING NARRATIVE EXPECTATIONS
A further inconsistency between narrative and trial arises because stories
require a type of engagement with the evidence that jurors are not formally
permitted.128 Jurors are often instructed to interpret the evidence in light of their
common sense and their experience in life,129 and they are traditionally praised
by commentators for the perspective that they bring to the courtroom.130 At the
same time, however, they are deemed passive recipients of information. Al-
though some reformers have advocated for increased participation in the form
of juror note taking and questioning,131 the current conception of the jury
precludes any outside knowledge of the actual facts in issue. Recent concern
about jurors consulting Google, Wikipedia, Facebook, Twitter, litigants’ blogs,
and other social media underscores that principle.132 As opposed to the common
law jury, which had at least some opportunity not only to interpret facts but also
Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1608–09 (2005) (mentioning the “periodic disconnect between
resolution and truth” at trial).
128. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (“The theory of our system is that the
conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and
not by any outside inﬂuence, whether of private talk or public print.”).
129. See, e.g., PATTERN CRIMINAL FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 1.04 (1998),
available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pjury.pdf (“You should use common sense in weighing the
evidence and consider the evidence in light of your own observations in life.”).
130. See G. K. CHESTERTON, TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 85–86 (1920) (“[I]t is a terrible business to mark a
man out for the vengeance of men. But it is a thing to which a man can grow accustomed, as he can to
other terrible things . . . . And the horrible thing about all legal ofﬁcials . . . is simply that they have got
used to it.”); PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 154 (1956) (commenting that jurors may not be as skilled as
judges at “separating the wheat from the chaff” but “there are some cases in which a little admixture of
chaff is not a bad thing”).
131. See B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and
Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1247–61 (1993) (proposing a variety of reforms to increase juror
participation); see also VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 112, at 130 (noting increasing support for juror
queries and note taking); Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Some Suggestions for the Critical Appraisal
of a More Active Jury, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 231 tbl.3 (1990) (surveying state judges’ reactions to
juror note taking and submission of questions); cf. LAUDAN, supra note 45, at 137 (arguing that the
“obstacles that discourage jurors from asking questions of witnesses,” the jury’s “inability to subpoena
those who appear to have a knowledge of the crime,” and the jury’s “inability to ask for independent
expert witnesses to address issues they ﬁnd perplexing” are all among the “evidentiary practices [that]
hinder the ability of the jury to come to a correct verdict”).
132. See John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html?_moc.semityn.www&pagewantedprint
(“The use of Blackberrys and iPhones by jurors gathering and sending out information about cases is
wreaking havoc on trials around the country, upending deliberations and infuriating judges.”); see also,
e.g., United States v. Sabir, 628 F. Supp. 2d 414, 421–25 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (denying a mistrial after a
juror Googled the names of defendant’s coconspirators, ﬁnding that the presumption of outside
information being prejudicial was sufﬁciently rebutted in this instance); State v. Boling, 127 P.3d 740,
741 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding a grant of mistrial after a juror explored possible causes of death
in a manslaughter case on his own and then shared the results of his Internet searches with other jurors).
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to uncover them,133 the modern American jury is composed of “neutral arbiters”
whose “formal role is as an observer of the proceedings.”134
In narrative, however, readers necessarily become participants in the story.
And the story model likewise posits jurors speculating about facts external to
the trial in order to complete the picture.135 Readers construct the events
themselves “in the light of the overall narrative,”136 and by the time an audience
confronts a story, “readers necessarily become coauthors of and participants in
that world.”137 Some literary theorists follow this concept to its endpoint and
conclude that stories have a life of their own, that authorial intent is irrelevant,
and even that the author is “dead.”138 A passive jury—theoretically shielded
from outside inﬂuences and even regarded as untrustworthy with complex,
inﬂammatory, or prejudicial evidence—is thus at odds with the audience de-
scribed in narrative theory.
Furthermore, narrative form creates expectations that guide how listeners
participate in the construction of meaning. The Old Chief decision justiﬁed
descriptive richness on the ground that colorful stories “satisfy the jurors’
133. Larry Laudan describes the early English jury, which would “conduct its own inquiries, often
including interviews outside of the courtroom proper”:
Jurors were simultaneously the chief repository of knowledge about the crime, the interpreters
of the relevant law that applied to the case, and the triers of fact, who would settle issues of
guilt and innocence. Jurors could interrogate whomever they liked (including the defendant),
and put to them whatever questions they thought relevant.
LAUDAN, supra note 45, at 215; see also, e.g., JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT
AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 115–26 (2006) (discussing the “self-informing jury” and the
expectation in twelfth through sixteenth century England that jurors would “know or . . . ﬁnd out the
facts of the event or events in dispute and . . . decide without the help of any documentary or
testimonial evidence given in court”); Daniel Klerman, Was the Jury Ever Self-Informing?, 77 S. CAL.
L. REV. 123, 127 (2003) (concluding that the thirteenth century jury was “sufﬁciently well-informed
that regulation of in-court testimony was not seen as important”); Barbara J. Shapiro, “To a Moral
Certainty”: Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American Juries 1600–1850, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 155
(1986) (“Jurors, men of the neighborhood, were assumed to know the facts and to incorporate their own
knowledge into the verdict. Juries thus arrived at ﬁndings of fact guided by common sense and common
knowledge.”). But see George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 591–97 &
nn.44–51, 55 (1997) (questioning assumptions about the self-informing jury).
134. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 112, at 129; see also id. (“The law’s ideal juror is a blank slate on
which only attorneys can write.”); cf. MIRJAN R. DAMASˇKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 29 (1997) (“One
would expect a legal process that gloriﬁes novice amateurs as fact ﬁnders to presume their intellectual
and emotional capacity for the job.”).
135. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 112, at 135 (“While the trial evidence and legal context set the
parameters, the differing life experiences and beliefs frequently result in jurors drawing on different
scripts and constructing divergent narratives.”); Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 58,
at 527 (explaining that the jury constructs the story in part by inferring events and adding causal
relationships to ﬁll gaps).
136. Bruner, supra note 116, at 8.
137. WINTER, supra note 32, at 122; see also Paul Gewirtz, Victims and Voyeurs: Two Narrative
Problems at the Criminal Trial, in LAW’S STORIES, supra note 42, at 144 (“[A]ll storytelling, after all, is
transactional, with listeners affecting tellers as well as tellers affecting listeners.”).
138. See, e.g., ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE—MUSIC—TEXT, supra note 30, at
142.
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expectations about what proper proof should be.”139 Anticipation that originates
from familiar narratives may, however, be misleading. Steven Winter offers the
example of “the hero’s uncanny ability to arrive in the nick of time” in a
suspense drama. That element provokes “relief rather than . . . skepticism” be-
cause it meets expectations, and the audience uses “contrivances of plot and
character” to make the accustomed story work.140 Jurors engage in similar
contrivances and, thus, may err in their interpretation of evidence. This might
occur when fact ﬁnders rely on preexisting models for stories in which every
detail has signiﬁcance, events occur in a basic sequence, the point of view is
omniscient, and the characters achieve closure.
First, jurors rely on expectations about stories to give meaning to pieces of
evidence that may have none. “Events are often simply meaningless, irrelevant
to what comes next; events can be out of sequence, random, purely accidental,
without purpose.”141 Some scholars who have documented the “storied nature
of our thinking” acknowledge as well that life itself rarely follows narrative
logic.142 Legal stories concern facts in the world, and they include some
mundane details because their central goal is not to “entertain, or to terrify, or to
illuminate life.”143 Often, people cannot even describe the reasons for action or
speak clearly about the basis of the choices they make,144 but in stories,
everything mentioned has salience. Fact ﬁnders therefore anticipate that acts
discussed at trial will have meaning, and they strive to ﬁt each piece into the
emerging picture of a defendant’s conduct, even when that effort produces
misleading results. Alan Dershowitz recounts the example of a trial in which a
businessman’s purchase of life insurance for his partner, who was murdered
shortly thereafter, seemed powerful circumstantial evidence of his guilt. In the
familiar genre of a legal thriller, buying the insurance policy would foreshadow
the killing, but in reality, people quite often take out life insurance policies on
business partners and family members with no ill intent.145 Narrative expecta-
139. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188 (1997).
140. WINTER, supra note 32, at 128.
141. Alan M. Dershowitz, Life Is Not a Dramatic Narrative, in LAW’S STORIES, supra note 42, at 99,
100; see also DIDION, supra note 35, at 13 (“I was meant to know the plot, but all I knew was what I
saw: ﬂash pictures in variable sequence, images with no ‘meaning’ beyond their temporary arrange-
ment, not a movie but a cutting-room experience . . . [but] I wanted still to believe in the narrative and
the narrative’s intelligibility . . . .”).
142. Brooks, supra note 53, at 25–26; see also KING, supra note 33, at 174 (“[D]o things have a
beginning, a middle, and an end in real life? . . . [L]ife usually doesn’t work that way.”); cf. ROLAND
BARTHES, Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives, in IMAGE–MUSIC–TEXT, supra note 30, at
119 (“On meeting in ‘life’, it is most unlikely that the invitation to take a seat would not immediately be
followed by the act of sitting down; in narrative these two units, contiguous from a mimetic point of
view, may be separated by a long series of insertions . . . .”).
143. Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW’S STORIES, supra note 42, at 2, 5.
144. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982); RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
145. Dershowitz, supra note 141, at 99–100. Dershowitz also notes Anton Chekhov’s famous
observation: “If in the ﬁrst chapter you say that a gun hung on the wall, in the second or third chapter it
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tions not only hazard wrongful convictions but can also prejudice the prosecu-
tion when they lead, for example, to an unfavorable image of a victim or an
unlikely alternative perpetrator. Some prosecutors also fear that jurors will fail
to separate the actual capacity of law enforcement from the scientiﬁc evidence
featured in procedural crime dramas.146
Second, jurors may import expectations about sequence from narrative conven-
tions. Trials themselves are not linear. Facts are presented in whatever order the
lawyers deem advantageous, and that often means that witnesses appear accord-
ing to strategic considerations rather than to track the chronological unfolding
of events. Timing depends, as well, on witness availability and trial schedules,
and the defense witnesses may also reset the timeline after the prosecution or
plaintiff has concluded the case. Layers of procedural rules further interrupt the
story’s chronology. Although trials at common law included extended mono-
logues within which each side could present a coherent narrative,147 contempo-
rary trials may begin with opening statements that evoke story telling, but they
proceed to a piecemeal presentation elicited through questions and interrupted
during the adversarial process of cross-examination and objections. In trials
with multiple defendants, serial cross-examinations of witnesses by their indi-
vidual lawyers make the narrative still more disjointed. Fact ﬁnders react to this
seemingly incoherent effort to chronicle what happened by imposing order on
the telling by using familiar plots.
Third, exposure to narrative constructs may give jurors misplaced conﬁdence
in their capacity to comprehend what has occurred. Fictional stories can expand
and contract as needed to convey images and ideas. Novelists recognize that the
“truth [is] not a line from here to there,”148 but trials focus on particular
moments and often leave out the contour and color crucial to understanding.
Trials do not “begin at the beginning”; they start where the events that give rise
must without fail be discharged.” Id. at 100 (quoting ANTON CHEKHOV: LITERARY AND THEATRICAL
REMINISCENCES 23 (S.S. Koteliansky ed. & trans., 1927)).
146. See, e.g., Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the “CSI Effect” Effect: Media
and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1335, 1339–40 (2009) (documenting an
extensive “CSI effect discourse” in the media); Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of Juror Expectations
and Demands Concerning Scientiﬁc Evidence: Does the ‘CSI Effect’ Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
331, 364 (2006) (concluding that the origins of juror expectations about prosecutors’ use of modern
science and technology stem from “the conﬂuence of rapid advances in science and information
technology and the increased use of crime stories as a vehicle to dramatize those advances”).
147. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HARV. L. REV. 295, 316–17 (1892).
Early courtrooms in the United States also allowed witnesses “a good deal of leeway to tell their stories
uninterrupted” with “less fussing over minor points of evidence . . . [and] less shadowboxing over rules
of procedure” and a “looser, freer, more colloquial” charge to the jury. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 237 (1993).
148. Haack, supra note 43, at 30–31 (“The truth [is] not a line from here to there, and not
ever-widening circles like the rings on a sawn log, but rather trails of oscillating overlapping liquids
that poured forth [and] assumed a shape and life of their own, that circled back around in spirals and
ﬂuctuations to touch and color all truths that came out after that one.” (ﬁrst alteration in original)
(quoting JEFFREY LENT, AFTER THE FALL 253–54 (2000))).
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to litigation do.149 Again consider the Jensen case. Where does that story
begin?: With Julie Jensen’s 1998 death, with the enmity between her and Mark,
with her struggle with depression, or as far back as her mysteriously troubled
childhood? Or take the 1998 murder prosecution of Leslie McGee, a teenager
who confessed to shooting a cab driver in Chicago.150 McGee was convicted at
a trial during which both the prosecution and the defense declined to mention
that she had a previous sexual relationship with the victim. The defense feared
the preexisting relationship would detract from arguments against premedita-
tion, and the prosecution feared “muddl[ing] things for the jury” by contradict-
ing the confession.151 “People exist over time,” as Mark Kelman explains, but
prosecutions focus on “untoward incidents—that these people commit,” often
omitting what happened before and after.152 Thus, the competing paradigms
advanced in an adversarial trial may actually, and unexpectedly, exclude salient
facts of what happened.
Although a complete story would require information ﬂow akin to an inclu-
sive “free proof” approach to admissibility,153 the premise of the rules of
evidence is that “less is more.”154 Witnesses testify in the “language of percep-
tion,” stripped of interpretation and opinion, and they are permitted to report
only what they observed ﬁrsthand and only in the form of a present account-
ing.155 Approximately seventy different federal evidentiary rules, many of them
divided into multiple subparts, articulate exceptions to the rule that all relevant
evidence is admissible.156 Many of those rules reﬂect skepticism about jurors or
the concern that complete, rich narratives will lead to collateral moral judg-
ments. In this editorial tradition, Kenworthey Bilz has written approvingly of
the “exclusionary” function of the rules and advocated for excising “structurally
relevant—but morally irrelevant—points of view.”157 In earlier work, Samuel
149. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 46–71 (1984) (discussing the
“reactive lawyer[ing]” paradigm).
150. See STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302: A YEAR BEHIND THE SCENES IN AN AMERICAN CRIMINAL
COURTHOUSE 236 (2005).
151. Id. at 242.
152. Kelman, supra note 39, at 593–94.
153. See Susan Haack, Epistemology Legalized: Or, Truth, Justice, and the American Way, 49 AM. J.
JURIS. 43, 56 (2004) (explaining that the “main theme” of Bentham’s “free proof” approach was that
exclusionary rules confound the epistemological desire for complete information).
154. See MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 53, at 121 (Edward W. Cleary et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1972) (“The great body of the law of evidence consists of rules that operate to exclude
relevant evidence.”); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The
Difﬁculty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2005) (“Trials search for truth
by excluding certain truths.”).
155. See BURNS, supra note 36, at 20.
156. The majority of state evidence codes draw heavily on the Federal Rules of Evidence. 6T
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2012).
157. Bilz, supra note 62, at 434 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 433 (“[J]ustice is not passively
blind; we often must proactively blind her.”). Bilz’s intriguing argument is not that the narrative model
is an inaccurate or distorting account of what occurs at trial, but rather that the prevailing conception of
narrative itself is incorrect. She uses literary theory to argue that the unﬁltered “richness” associated
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Gross summarized the merits of paring down the presentation of evidence:
Any exclusion of relevant evidence involves some distortion of reality in the
sense that the picture presented to the trier of fact includes less information
than the available total. . . . Distortion in this general sense is not necessarily
bad. It can serve general social goals, make trials more efﬁcient, and improve
the accuracy of fact-ﬁnding by focusing attention on relevant issues and
probative evidence.158
That aspiration to make jurors more discerning, however, often conﬂicts with
their expectations that the trial narrative will paint a complete picture. The
narrative construct prompts jurors to resist evidentiary limitations, and thus they
supplement the evidence with what they imagine to be the untold parts of the
story. “[T]rue-but-incomplete account[s]” may mislead,159 and missing details
can “substantially change the signiﬁcance of the stories told at trial.”160 When
jurors supply those details according to generic narratives or their personal
experiences, they may reach false conclusions. Trials can thus become “bad
narrative[s]” that “deceive[] with the illusion of concreteness.”161
Finally, stories raise expectations for closure, and jurors may rely on narrative
to reach decisions even when the weight of the evidence is not sufﬁcient to
support a verdict. Narrative is a tool of reconciliation; it favors resolution and
often achieves it by transforming deviations into accepted cultural patterns.162
with a narrative model of judging is actually incompatible with the discernment that characterizes
literature. And she describes narrative as “a close and careful interpretative description” that offers an
experience “deeper, sharper, and more precise than much of what takes place in life.” Id. at 443–46
(quoting MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 47–48
(1990)).
158. Gross, supra note 65, at 843 (footnotes omitted).
159. Haack, supra note 43, at 30. This point relates to the admission of prejudicial evidence that is
“inextricably intertwined” with the government’s case against a defendant. See, e.g., United States v.
DeGeorge, 380 F.3d 1203, 1219–20 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d
1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The jury cannot be expected to make its decision in a void—without
knowledge of the time, place, and circumstances of the acts which form the basis of the charge.”))
(concluding that the jury in an insurance fraud case could not understand the relevant transaction
without information about the defendant’s three prior losses of insured vessels at sea).
160. Robert P. Burns, A Short Meditation on Some Remaining Issues in Evidence Law, 38 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1435, 1437 (2008); accord Haack, supra note 43, at 31 (concluding that “the effect of
telling only part of the truth” can be “to slant or to skew the audience’s perception of the larger truth
that is not told”).
161. Weisberg, supra note 89, at 67 (“Bad narrative deceives with the illusion of concreteness,
selecting and deleting facts and naming people and things to distort them to ﬁt a conventionally
acceptable legal conclusion.”).
162. See BRUNER, supra note 28, at 49–50 (stating that one function of story “is to ﬁnd an intentional
state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a deviation from a canonical cultural pattern”
(emphasis omitted)); id. at 47 (explaining that narrative provides an essential “set of interpretive
procedures for rendering departures from . . . norms meaningful in terms of established patterns of
belief”); BURNS, supra note 119, at 32 (observing that stories “are told when there has been a deviation
from a traditional pattern and the community needs to understand the event in light of an inventory of
commonsense beliefs about the sources of deviance”).
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Trials similarly involve disruptions of arrangements and relationships, and the
process of adjudication enables the restoration of some desired order. When a
child dies or is seriously injured, for example, the need to place blame can feel
acute. That desire for closure may have overridden questionable evidence in a
series of cases involving “shaken-baby syndrome.”163 Several caregivers con-
victed of murder or abuse are seeking new trials because the medical evidence
introduced at trial now appears inconclusive.164 Although there was some
conﬂicting testimony even a decade ago, many experts at the time stated that
subdural bleeding indicated recent shaking. Medical experts now believe that
the symptoms classically associated with “shaken baby syndrome” could also
be attributable to old skull fractures, chronic hematomas from traumatic births,
bleeding disorders, and infections. And when those symptoms do stem from
abuse, the causal injury may have taken place days, rather than hours, before the
injury manifested and, thus, cannot necessarily be attributed to the most recent
caregiver.165
Narrative can jeopardize accuracy because it offers the illusion of understand-
ing the often terrible and unpredictable events that give rise to litigation.166 It
can prompt fact ﬁnders to overvalue, and deem conclusive, evidence that
converts readily to a recognizable plot. Julie Jensen’s letter, for example, did
more to lead the jury to conviction than any other evidence and rereading it was
what ﬁnally convinced one holdout juror.167 Much of the testimony in the
Jensen case was conﬂicting, and all of it was circumstantial. Indeed, one juror
reported thinking that Julie’s letter itself “wasn’t making any sense.”168 Over
the course of the trial, however, the jurors developed “deep sympathy for Julie
Jensen and disdain for Mark.”169 Jurors commented that they found his failure
to seek medical attention for Julie, his consumption of pornography, his de-
163. Emily Bazelon, Shaken-Baby Syndrome Faces New Questions in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/magazine/06baby-t.html?pagewantedprint.
164. See id.; see also Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 9 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that
recent scientiﬁc research “casts grave doubt” on the prosecution’s expert testimony on shaken-baby
syndrome).
165. Cavazos, 132 S. Ct. at 9–11. The Cavazos case also underscores the epistemic challenges that
dueling experts pose. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Scientiﬁc Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process,
107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1680 (1998) (arguing that nonexpert judges and jurors are incapable of evaluating
competing scientiﬁc experts “in an epistemically nonarbitrary manner”); Marianne Wesson, Historical
Truth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60 WASH. L. REV. 331, 333 (1985) (discussing expert
claims to privileged knowledge of historical truth).
166. Cf. LUBET, supra note 121, at 7 (“Even the people who observe an event seldom know what
really happened . . . . A courtroom reconstruction, alas, is at best an approximation, . . . [an] effort to
extract a reliable conclusion from the ineffable secrets of past events.”); SCHRAGER, supra note 91, at 7
(“Stories give meaning to things that happen to people, things that in the absence of stories about them
may be too complicated or confusing, too painful or mysterious, to ﬁgure out at all.”).
167. See Katie DeLong, Jensen Juror: “Sorry It Took Ten Years,” TMJ 4 MILWAUKEE (Feb. 22, 2008),
http://www.todaystmj4.com/news/local/45620947.html; Kertscher, supra note 24.
168. Mark Jensen Guilty of First Degree Murder, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.
todaystmj4.com/news/local/45620582.html.
169. Kertscher, supra note 24.
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meanor in court, and his “unemotional and cold” personality concerning.170 One
member of the jury further explained that the jurors felt unequal to the task of
being “psychologists” and evaluating whether Julie was suicidal,171 but they did
ﬁnd the letter accessible, and it eventually convinced them of Mark’s guilt.172
The issue, then, is not that narratives are inherently irrational but rather that they
can make events appear more linear than they are. The raw truth of what
transpires between people may be incoherent, and it may be mercurial. Julie
Jensen shifted in complex ways throughout her life and has continued to do so
during the decade of investigation and litigation that followed her death. That
the jurors processed the evidence as a story helped them reach a decision, but
narrative structures also smoothed over a multifaceted situation in the process.
Trials make jurors choose, and narratives give them a false sense of complete-
ness and closure when they do. The selected story of “what happened” binds to
receptors formed through a lifetime of stories. Once that bond is formed, other
ideas are suppressed, in much the same way that one particularly salient
conversation can make surrounding ones just background noise. These familiar
stories, however, report only how people usually act; they codify common
sense. Yet “knowledge about what typically happens in the world”173—which
the story model deems a central part of jury decision making—does not
necessarily improve accuracy when jurors confront the anomalous situations
that give rise to criminal cases. The story model describes decision makers
turning to stories to ﬁnd meaning when confronted with deviations.174 Narrative
theory, however, reveals that the stories themselves arise from conventional
patterns, and that those familiar templates may serve as poor tools for compre-
hending extreme behavior.
C. HEURISTIC AND EMOTIONAL DECISION MAKING
Trials thus leave gaps in signiﬁcance, sequence, and completeness that defy
narrative expectations and at the same time invite fact ﬁnders to sketch in
details. In those moments of uncertainty, confronted with contradictory informa-
170. Id.
171. Mark Jensen Guilty of First Degree Murder, supra note 168.
172. See DeLong, supra note 167. The signiﬁcance of the Jensen letter calls to mind Marianne
Wesson’s critique of the epistolary evidence in Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York. v. Hillmon, 145
U.S. 285 (1892), which gave rise to the “state of mind” exception to the hearsay prohibition in evidence
law. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3). According to Wesson, the authenticity of Frederick Adolph Waters’s
letter to his ﬁance´e Alvina Kasten (which famously declared his intention to travel to Crooked Creek
with John Hillmon) was taken for granted because the courts grew attached to the false narrative that
Hillmon had murdered Waters. Wesson, supra note 52, at 346–50.
173. Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory, supra note 58, at 527–28.
174. Cf. Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REV. 1599, 1604 (2009) (“[N]arrative is
a conventional, familiar, and appropriate methodology for producing the truth about or, more precisely,
the meaning of human action, including those acts that we deem to be crimes.” (footnotes omitted));
id. at 1620 (“Our narrative impulse arises most strongly when—and because—we encounter and need
to understand conduct that is extraordinary or nonsensical when measured by the conventional patterns
for the context in which it occurs.”).
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tion, both jurors and judges may resort to heuristic decision making. Heuristics
produce the intuitive judgments that form automatically and typically escape
scrutiny. To take some common examples, the “availability heuristic” arises
when jurors assess the probability of an event according to the ease with which
they can bring occurrences of that event to mind.175 “Conﬁrmation bias” causes
jurors to interpret evidence in a fashion that supports existing preferences,
beliefs, expectations, and theories.176 The “focusing illusion” magniﬁes the
importance of any detail under consideration.177 And “belief perseverance” can
make jurors more likely to doubt evidence that conﬂicts with a preexisting
paradigm and to interpret what is ambiguous as consistent with that belief.178
Consider the durability of the “never forget a face” concept. Despite mount-
ing evidence linking eyewitness identiﬁcation errors to wrongful convictions, a
recent study revealed that jurors continue to disregard variables that detract
from eyewitness accuracy.179 These kinds of shortcuts may helpfully moderate
the ﬂow of information, but they can also increase the probability of cognitive
bias and processing error. Some perceived shortcuts simply lead the wrong way.
To take another example, the widespread belief that sexual offenders recidivate
at a high rate, and therefore that a defendant’s past sexual assaults are unusually
salient evidence, ﬁnds no support in the statistical evidence on repeat of-
fenses.180
The metaphors, anecdotes, and superﬁcial associations of heuristic persuasion
underscore potential problems with decision making that draws upon stories.
175. See, e.g., Jennifer Groscup & Jennifer Tallon, Theoretical Models of Jury Decision-Making, in
JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES 41, 55 (Joel D. Lieberman & Daniel A. Krauss
eds., 2009).
176. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7, 15 (2002).
177. KAHNEMAN, supra note 103, at 402–06.
178. See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of
Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099
(1979) (“[J]udgments about the validity, reliability, relevance, and sometimes even the meaning of
proffered evidence are biased by the apparent consistency of that evidence with the perceiver’s theories
and expectations.”). For more general information on heuristic decision making, see, for example, REID
HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT
AND DECISION MAKING (2001). And for further discussion of the difference between central and
peripheral routes to persuasion, see, for example, RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, ATTITUDES AND
PERSUASION: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARYAPPROACHES (1981).
179. See Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing
Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115,
119–20 (2006).
180. See, e.g., Aviva Orenstein & Tamara Rice Lave, Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: A
Critical Look at the Admission of Prior Sex Crimes, U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract2143174. The perceived link between sexual offenders and recidivism,
however, pervades both the narratives accessible to jurors and the political process in which some rules
of evidence are promulgated. Id.; see FED. R. EVID. 413–15 (permitting evidence of the accused’s prior
acts of sexual assault in sexual assault and child molestation cases).
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Evidence with strong emotional content particularly endangers accuracy.181
Emotion can focus attention and inspire critical thinking, but it can also cloud
judgment about human behavior. Archetypes and metaphors hold sway because
they stir feelings or trigger memories. For example, jurors recognize stock
characters and then overvalue character traits as a determinant of behavior in
life.182 In stories, the characters’ actions are plausible and their tales compelling
because their “nature” has been shown to the reader.183 Stories offer close
relationships to characters quite different from the merely approximate way in
which one knows other people in everyday life, where neither “complete
clairvoyance” nor “complete confessional” exists.184 As in life, trials reveal
intent only through layers of inference, and jurors have no direct access to the
motivations of witnesses or parties. Cognitive types like protagonist and antago-
nist may be too binary for the intricate conﬂicts that trials seek to adjudicate.
When stories turn complex litigants into the jurors’ preexisting images of what
characters should be, their implicit emotional response is a source of preju-
dice.185
Narrative is thus not only the inevitable tool of advocates but also a sticky
concept that has unseen inﬂuence in the process of adjudication. Narrative
theory explains that the primary link between fact and judgment is the subjectiv-
ity of the adjudicator, including her commitments, attitudes, and experiences.
181. Overwhelmingly emotional evidence faces exclusion under the rules. See FED. R. EVID. 403
(“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). But Old Chief and its
progeny have made the argument against sensational (and narratively rich) evidence more difﬁcult.
182. See, e.g., LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 90–91 (1991) (“[P]eople are inveterate dispositionalists. They account for past
actions and outcomes, and make predictions about future actions and outcomes, in terms of the
person—or more speciﬁcally, in terms of presumed personality traits or other distinctive and enduring
personal dispositions.”); see also Gross, supra note 65, at 853 (commenting that in stories “character is
a strong and reliable predictor of conduct, by authorial ﬁat” and that the “ambition of trial lawyers is to
achieve that sort of control in court” by enacting “familiar, proven forms”).
183. See Gross, supra note 65, at 853 (“We know why ﬁctional people act as they do because we are
told.”).
184. E.M. FORSTER, ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL 74 (1927); see also id. at 47 (“We know each other
approximately, by external signs, and these serve well enough as a basis for society and even for
intimacy. But people in a novel can be understood completely by the reader, if the novelist wishes; their
inner as well as their outer life can be exposed.”).
185. See Dershowitz, supra note 141, at 104 (“‘[B]ad man’ evidence—a history of prior criminal-
ity—is always relevant in literature and rarely in criminal trials. And it is precisely because of its
prevalence in literature that it is so prejudicial in court.”). Justice Jackson discussed the danger that
juries will overweigh character in Michelson v. United States:
The State may not show defendant’s prior trouble with the law, speciﬁc criminal acts, or ill
name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by
propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. . . . [Character] is said to weigh too much with
the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny
him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.
335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
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But the purposes of trial require some distinction between producing legal truth
and the constitutive experience of reading and responding to a story. Accord-
ingly, trial procedures should focus on guiding the decision maker to maintain
that boundary when it is feasible to do so. What the jury considers will never be
the “whole truth” that witnesses ostensibly promise when they take the stand,
but it should at least be “nothing but the truth,” and as free from cognitive bias
as possible. The tension between the evidentiary rules and narrative expecta-
tions creates an opportunity to exact more analytic assessments. And pressing
jurors to think outside of the constraints of archetypes might produce better
outcomes at trial.
III. CAN TRIALS BALANCE STORIES AND ACCURACY?
A. END-TO-END MODIFICATIONS
The law of evidence has long engaged to some extent in the regulation of
story telling. To date, however, references to the role of stories in both eviden-
tiary rulings and academic commentary have primarily addressed the admission
or exclusion of evidence.186 The reﬂexive and uncritical acceptance of the story
model by some courts, for example, has led to expansions of Old Chief’s theory
of admissibility. But a close look at narrative theory exposes procedural issues
from end to end in the process of adjudication. And a different way to be
attentive to the distortions revealed by narrative theory—and the focus of this
Article—is to consider improvements in the reception of stories. Silencing
advocates, who necessarily communicate in narrative, would prove impossible
and, in important respects, undesirable.
The point here is not to suggest that narrative is inherently a ﬂawed form or
entirely incompatible with verdict accuracy. The intertwined relationship be-
tween different cognitive processes and the hybrid nature of decision making
suggest instead that narrative reasoning can coexist with more analytic ap-
proaches. But a fuller understanding of narrative’s problematic features points
to possibilities for either insulating or empowering decision makers. Various
aspects of trial mechanics might beneﬁt from more nuanced rules designed to
correct for some of the complexities of human communication and cognition.
And the closer look at the story model offered here—which identiﬁes both the
limits of its explanatory power and the ways it can operate to deceive—begins
to suggest reforms from the discovery stage through appellate review of eviden-
tiary errors.
For example, due process demands that prosecutors disclose to the defense
all “evidence favorable to an accused” that is “material either to guilt or to
186. See, e.g., Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal Defendants’ Post-Crime
State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 975 (2008). Narrative theory has also informed
questions concerning the admission of impeachment evidence that inhibits a defendant’s opportunity to
take the stand and thus precludes the defendant from telling his or her story. See, e.g., Barbara Allen
Babcock, Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1993).
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punishment.”187 This includes evidence that “might have affected the outcome
of the trial.”188 In practice, this standard has proven difﬁcult to apply.189
Narrative theory suggests some reasons why. A before-the-fact determination
as to how each piece of evidence will interact with and affect other parts of
the tale told at trial is virtually impossible as is any accurate prediction about
whether particular parts of the story will awaken preconceptions that the fact
ﬁnders bring to court. The prosecutor, moreover, approaches the assess-
ment whether evidence is meaningfully exculpatory with his own convincing
story of the defendant’s guilt already running on a reel in his mind. Even
prosecutors with the best intentions may fail to appreciate the signiﬁcance of a
potential disclosure. At one end of the spectrum—where evidence like an
alternative perpetrator holding the proverbial smoking gun lies—any prosecutor
would be on notice of the fair-trial implications of discovery. But the case
ﬁle will mostly contain evidence subject to judgment calls, such as small
inconsistencies in eyewitness descriptions and other details that might detract
from the credibility of a prosecution witness. Given that meaning is pro-
duced not only from the evidence itself but also from its interaction with
other facts and arguments and its intersection with preexisting narrative
schemes to which jurors have been exposed, there can be no conﬁdent forecasts
about the impact an inconsistency will have. Accordingly, either consistently
broad “open ﬁle” rules, or a standard that mandates disclosure of any evidence
that “tends to negate . . . guilt,” would better respond to the due process con-
cern.190
Another aspect of the process of criminal adjudication that might be con-
strued as a missed opportunity to counterweigh subjectivity is the debate over
the reasonable doubt standard. Triers of fact not only determine “guilt” but also
assess the “story of guiltiness,” in the words of the Old Chief decision.191 The
reasonable doubt standard similarly contemplates “moral certainty” that a crimi-
nal defendant is guilty.192 The emphasis on a fact ﬁnder’s state of mind with
regard to the evidence elevates subjective considerations and invites associative
187. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
188. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
189. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2132 (2010).
190. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2012) (imposing ethical standards for the
disclosure of all evidence that “tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense,”
without regard to materiality or its likely impact on trial outcome, a broader approach than Brady’s
requirements); see also New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the
Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1968 (2010) (discussing possible
reforms such as open-ﬁle discovery).
191. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 188 (1997).
192. See LAUDAN, supra note 45, at 32–50, 51 (discussing the origins of the reasonable doubt
standard and various efforts to deﬁne it); see also, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979)
(stating that the reasonable doubt standard is met by a decision maker’s “near certitude”); Elisabeth
Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conﬂict Between Precision and Flexibility in Explaining
“Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 769 (2000) (analyzing the standard of
“moral certainty”).
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processing. As Justice Harlan explained, concurring in In re Winship, the
standard speaks to the “degree of conﬁdence [a fact ﬁnder] is expected to have
in the correctness of his factual conclusions.”193 The requisite level of conﬁ-
dence, however, is poorly and inconsistently deﬁned, and many jurisdictions
decline to characterize it at all.194 The extant instructions attempting a deﬁnition
focus only on the strength of belief and provide no information as to the quality
or quantity of evidence sufﬁcient to support it.195 Clearer and more compre-
hensive instructions could introduce a greater element of objectivity by, for
example, directing fact ﬁnders to infer innocence when there are plausible
explanations of the evidence consistent with that conclusion.196 The defense in
the Jensen case, for example, requested an instruction that contains echoes of
Pardo and Allen’s explanation-based account,197 which is one approach with
some potential for balancing probability and narrative processes. The requested
instruction read: “[I]f the evidence which you have heard is susceptible of two
interpretations, each of which appears to be reasonable, and only one of which
points to the guilt of the defendant, it is your duty to adopt the interpretation
which will admit the defendant’s innocence and reject that which points to his
guilt.”198
Critically evaluating the story model also brings to light an incorrect assump-
193. 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
194. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“[T]he Constitution does not require that any
particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof.”); see also
Dunbar v. United States, 156 U.S. 185, 199 (1895) (“Repeated attempts have been made by judges to
make clear to the minds of the jury what is meant by the words ‘reasonable doubt’; but, as said by
Mr. Justice Woods, speaking for this court, in Miles v. U.S., 103 U.S. 304, 312 [1880]: ‘Attempts to
explain the term “reasonable doubt” do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the
jury.’”); Jessica N. Cohen, The Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction: Giving Meaning to a Critical
Concept, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 677, 687–88 (1995) (noting that several states forbid any deﬁnition of the
standard); Jon O. Newman, Beyond “Reasonable Doubt,” 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 982–90 (1993)
(discussing the lack of any ﬁxed meaning for the standard).
195. See Larry Laudan, Is It Finally Time to Put “Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” Out to
Pasture?, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 317, 319 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012)
(“The brute psychological fact that a juror has no lingering, rational doubts about a defendant’s guilt
may or may not indicate that the hypothesis of the latter’s guilt has passed epistemic tests that would
warrant a well-founded belief that the defendant committed the crime in question.”).
196. See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo, Second-Order Proof Rules, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1083, 1105–06 (2009)
(proffering a reasonable doubt instruction that would improve the quality of decision making by
explaining that facts are proven beyond a reasonable doubt “when there is a plausible explanation of the
evidence and events in dispute that includes this fact and no plausible explanation that does not include
this fact”); see also, e.g., Elizabeth R. Tenney et al., Unpacking the Doubt in “Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt”: Plausible Alternative Stories Increase Not Guilty Verdicts, 31 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1
(2009).
197. See Pardo &Allen, supra note 70, at 225.
198. Defendant’s Requested Non-Pattern Jury Instruction No. 14, State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3,
331 Wis. 2d 440, 794 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) (No. 02-CF-314). The related instruction the
jury actually received read: “If you can reconcile the evidence upon any reasonable hypothesis
consistent with the defendant’s innocence, you should do so and return a verdict of not guilty.” Jury
Instructions, State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 794 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010)
(No. 02-CF-314).
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tion about atomistic evidence at the heart of appellate consideration of trial
errors concerning the admission or exclusion of evidence. Evidentiary errors are
subject to harmless error review,199 and even constitutional errors at criminal
trials do not require reversal if they are “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”200
In practice, two basic approaches to applying the harmless error standards have
emerged: a “guilt-based” approach201 and an “effect-on-the-verdict” ap-
proach.202 Increasingly, rather than engage in the difﬁcult exercise of assessing
whether the error contributed to the verdict in some fashion, courts comb the
record to ask “whether independent evidence of guilt taken alone could support
the conviction.”203 In the Jensen case, for example, the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals concluded that even if admission of Julie Jensen’s letter was a Confron-
tation Clause violation, the error was harmless because other trial testimony
established the same basic facts.204 Narrative theory suggests, however, that
there is no such thing as “independent evidence of guilt.” And the court’s
conclusion underscores how stories might compromise legal as well as factual
truth. It is not possible for judges to accurately picture the trial that “would
have” included the improperly rejected evidence or excluded the evidence that
was erroneously admitted.205 And in hindsight, almost every conviction will
appear inevitable and sound.206
Instead of asking whether “in a trial that occurred without . . . error, a guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered,” courts might inquire “whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the
error.”207 In other words, reviewing courts should not attempt to imagine a trial
199. See FED. R. EVID. 103 (stating that evidentiary errors require reversal only where “the error
affects a substantial right of the party”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (deﬁning “harmless error” as “[a]ny
error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights” and providing that such
errors “must be disregarded”).
200. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
201. See Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law,
2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 59.
202. See Harry T. Edwards, Lecture, To Err is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should
Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (1995).
203. Garrett, supra note 201; see also Edwards, supra note 202 (explaining that, under a guilt-based
approach, “more often than not, [judges] review the record to determine how [they] might have decided
the case; the judgment as to whether an error is harmless is therefore dependent on [their] judgment
about the factual guilt of the defendant”).
204. See State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶¶ 38–73, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 465–74, 794 N.W.2d 482,
495–99 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010).
205. See Edwards, supra note 202, at 1173 (“[I]t is impossible for an appellate judge to consider
whether an error has inﬂuenced a jury without thinking about the weight of the evidence against the
defendant; and once an appellate judge lapses into this mindset, it is difﬁcult to avoid guilt-based
decisionmaking.”).
206. Cf. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG
200–04 (2011) (discussing the conclusions on direct appeal that errors were inconsequential or that
defendants were obviously guilty in hundreds of cases with subsequent postconviction exonerations
through DNA evidence).
207. Virgin Islands v. Davis, 561 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508
U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).
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free of error but instead consider the trial that did take place. They could then
holistically evaluate the seriousness of the error and its likely position in the
constellation of facts that emerged at trial.208 That examination might include an
assessment of the narrative advanced by the government, and the extent to
which a particular evidentiary error affects the entire narrative arc or merely a
discrete or insigniﬁcant piece of it. And even in the case of testimony that
broadly interacts with the trial narrative, courts might conclude that either
admitting or excluding wholly duplicative or cumulative evidence did not affect
a verdict. On the other hand, the inclusion of a unique and inculpatory piece
could alter the reception of other evidence, as could the exclusion of a distinc-
tive and exculpatory one.
B. AN APPLIED THEORY OF LEGAL FICTIONS
Narrative theory suggests that it is impossible for prosecutors to assess
materiality ex ante, or for judges to imagine a separate error-free trial. It thus
exposes the legal ﬁction of discrete evidentiary components. A similar approach
to the underlying assumption in jury instructions holds promise for improving
jury deliberation and decision making. Before considering modiﬁcations, how-
ever, a fuller understanding of the “untruthful” quality of instructions is re-
quired. That is, what premise stands in the way of reform?
The idea that ﬁctions necessarily exist in the law—both producing it and
produced by it—is an old one.209 The purpose of legal ﬁctions, according to the
classic deﬁnition, is to “reconcile a speciﬁc legal result with some premise.”210
A legal ﬁction is often a “factual statement a judge, a legal scholar or a lawyer
tells, while simultaneously understanding full well—and also understanding
that the audience understands—that the statement is not fact.”211 Some of
these false statements are simply procedural devices “recognized as having
utility.”212 “Constructive” service of process and “constructive” notice, for ex-
ample, have an inherent “as if” quality.213 Peter Smith has put a modern gloss
208. And in this more holistic analysis, an “uncertain judge should treat the error, not as if it were
harmless, but as if it affected the verdict.” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995); see also
Edwards, supra note 202, at 1194 (concluding that, if there is “any serious doubt” as to “what a jury
might have done if the case had been tried without error,” it “ought to be returned to the jury”).
209. See LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 1 (1967) (stating that there is “scarcely a ﬁeld of the law in
which one does not encounter” legal ﬁctions).
210. Id. at 51; id. at 4–5 (arguing that keeping the “skeleton” of legal ﬁctions “in the closet is both
dangerous and unbecoming”); accord Louise Harmon, Falling off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the
Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 15 (1990) (explaining that Fuller connects the
danger of legal ﬁctions to lack of awareness about their falsehood).
211. Annelise Riles, Is the Law Hopeful? 3–4 (Cornell Law Faculty, Working Paper No. 68, 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id1408522. Other examples of factual
ﬁctions include in rem forfeiture and the equation of a corporation with a person. See id.
212. L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL L. REV. 363, 369 (1930).
213. See, e.g., Warren v. Stancliff, 251 A.2d 74, 76 (Conn. 1968) (“Constructive notice is premised
on the policy determination that under certain circumstances a person should be treated as if he had
actual knowledge so that one should not be permitted to deny knowledge when he is acting so as to
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on this concept and deﬁned ﬁctions as legal rules offered as factual suppositions
even though social science demonstrates their falsehood.214
Legal ﬁctions are generally regarded as both necessary and practical. As
Nancy Knauer explains, a legal ﬁction presents a conundrum because it “retains
its utility despite its falsity.”215 They are also, however, viewed with suspicion.
A survey of the Supreme Court’s use of the term “legal ﬁction” reveals an
underlying sense that there is something dangerously deceptive about them. The
phrase generally appears in opinions with negative connotations and is most
often used in dissent.216 On the other hand, even legal ﬁctions’ detractors ﬁnd
them harmless so long as there is full knowledge of the pretense. According to
Jerome Frank’s realist critique, if they are used without awareness of their
“purely ‘operational’ character,” then they become “harmful dogmas.”217 But
keep himself ignorant.” (emphasis added)); Latimer v. Union Pac. Ry., 43 Mo. 105, 110 (Mo. 1968)
(explaining that, when the statutory requirements are met, “judgment should go against the others in
like manner as if they were served with process, the service of process upon one being regarded as
constructive service upon the rest” (emphasis added)); see also Riles, supra note 211, at 6–7. Riles
builds on the work of epistemologist Hans Vaihinger, who concluded that legal ﬁctions are “As
ifs”—neither true nor not true but rather themselves the tension between what is true and not true. Id.
(citing H. VAIHINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF “AS IF” xlvii (C.K. Ogden trans., 2001) (1924)).
214. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1441 (2007).
215. Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1, 6 (2010).
216. The Court has used the term approximately one hundred times but has not engaged in any
extended analysis of the concept. The term has been deployed primarily as a descriptive phrase, such as
in Justice Scalia’s claim that it is a “legal ﬁction” that committee reports express the will of Congress.
Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 647 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Justice
Souter’s dissent in Caballes also termed it a “legal ﬁction” that drug-snifﬁng dogs are infallible. Illinois
v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Frederick Schauer, Legal
Fictions Revisited 1 (Aug. 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id1904555 (“It is no compliment nowadays to accuse a judge, a court, or a
theorist of employing a ‘legal ﬁction.’”).
A more classic understanding of legal ﬁctions appears in cases citing, for example, the ﬁction that
heirs who disclaim property have predeceased decedents, United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 279
(2002), the ﬁction that states “own” wild animals within their borders, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322, 335 (1979), the ﬁction that unwanted counsel “represents” the defendant, Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975) (characterizing the concept as a “tenuous and unacceptable legal ﬁction”),
and the ﬁction that an annulment makes the marriage ceremony as though it had never occurred, Sutton
v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 410 (1952).
The Court has also acknowledged that legal ﬁctions are a practical device with limits on appropriate
usage. On the issue whether the term “person” in the Sherman Act includes sovereigns, the Court
acknowledged that “legal ﬁctions have an appropriate place in the administration of the law when they
are required by the demands of convenience and justice.” United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600,
619–20 (1941) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 92
(1934), superseded by statute, Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), as recognized in U.S. Postal Serv. v.
Flamingo Indus. (USA), 540 U.S. 736 (2004). And the Court has further stated that legal ﬁctions are not
“unbending and uncontrollable principle[s] of law” but yield to actual facts. Columbus S. Ry. Co. v.
Wright, 151 U.S. 470, 479 (1894) (quoting Missouri v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378, 388 (1874); see also,
e.g., Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 29 (1891) (declining to ﬁnd unconstitu-
tional as incompatible with the Commerce Clause a state tax based on the “legal ﬁction” that “personal
property has its situs at the owner’s domicile”).
217. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 167 (1930); see also JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT
ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 509 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977)
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they are expedient assumptions so long as they are “consciously false.”218
The theory of legal ﬁctions provides a useful starting point for any discussion
of potential changes to jury instructions. Limiting instructions are recognized
ﬁctions, but they persist unchanged and cause some harm because the particular
falsehood within them has not been fully exposed. They potentially have great
utility but only with elevated awareness about how they interact with narrative
and what qualities make them ﬁctional. The foregoing discussion of narrative in
the courtroom helps deﬁne the ﬂawed assumption underlying limiting instruc-
tions: that any piece of evidence can be cleanly excised from the narrative that
unfolds at trial.
This ﬁction dates back to the ﬁrst uses of limiting instructions in the early
Republic when courts began instructing jurors on the use of “multiple evidence”
that is admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for others.219 Contemporary
jurors, who purportedly need to be “shielded, guided, and controlled” by the
court,220 also receive limiting instructions to mitigate their exposure to inadmis-
sible evidence like pretrial publicity,221 testimony ruled irrelevant or prejudi-
cial,222 or evidence within a rule of exclusion, such as the ones prohibiting the
introduction of insurance information223 or subsequent remedial measures.224
Most of the nonconstitutional exclusionary rules preclude the use of evidence
only for particular inferences.225 It is impermissible, for example, to introduce
prior crimes by a defendant to show her propensity to act in conformance
(2d enlarged ed. 1823) (deriding legal ﬁction as “delusion”); Cass R. Sunstein, Principles, Not Fictions,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1247, 1256 (1990) (distinguishing legal ﬁctions from interpretive ﬁctions).
218. Riles, supra note 211, at 6–8.
219. See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 13, at 40–43 (1904) (noting that it “is uniformly conceded that the instruction of the Court sufﬁces” to
prevent the jury from “misusing the evidence”). Several nineteenth century cases refer to limiting
instructions. In State v. Farmer, for example, the court wrote that “evidence properly admissible for
one purpose may be so perverted in its use as to effect a different and illegitimate purpose . . . [but]
[t]he correction of its abuse lies in such explanation as the presiding judge may feel required to give to
the jury concerning it.” 24 A. 985, 986 (Me. 1892); see also Pegg v. Warford, 7 Md. 582, 607 (1855)
(explaining that, when appropriate, a judge should “point out [to the jury] the branch of the case to
which the [challenged] evidence is not to be applied”); Willis v. Bernard, (1832) 131 Eng. Rep. 439,
441; 8 Bing. 376, 382–83 (ﬁnding that admitted evidence did not create reversible error when “the jury
were cautioned that it was not to be taken as evidence” for a different purpose).
220. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 277 (1978).
221. See, e.g., KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., 1A FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 11:08 (6th ed.
2012).
222. See, e.g., id. § 11:06 (providing sample instructions to the jury on improperly considering
objections and rulings on the admission of evidence).
223. See FED. R. EVID. 411; see, e.g., WASHINGTON PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS–CIVIL JURY 2.13 (6th ed.
2009).
224. See FED. R. EVID. 407; see, e.g., 1 PENNSYLVANIA BAR INSTITUTE, PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED
STANDARD CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.50 (4th ed. 2010).
225. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure and the Story Model,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 559, 568 (1991) (“Too many gaps would be created if evidence legitimately
relevant and admissible for one point was barred because it was irrelevant and inadmissible on some
other.”).
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with those other acts.226 That same evidence is admissible, however, when it ﬁts
within a theory other than propensity—such as “motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of acci-
dent”227—or when offered to impeach a witness,228 including a criminal defen-
dant who takes the stand.229 The underlying theory is one of nonpropensity–
based relevance in the former case and the sense that convictions indicate
greater willingness to breach the social contract, including by committing
perjury, in the latter. Jurors in the Jensen case, for example, heard evidence that
Mark Jensen frequently consumed pornography and had a substantial number of
ﬁles containing pornography saved on his computer because the court deemed it
relevant to Mark’s vindictive relationship with Julie as well as the frequency of
his Internet use.230 Jurors commented after the trial, however, that his posses-
sion of pornography broadly discredited the defendant and inﬂuenced their
conclusion that he tortured and killed his wife.231 Similarly, when a defendant
takes the stand and is exposed to questioning about prior crimes on the theory
that they impeach her credibility, no one “believes that the jury will consider
this evidence only as affecting credence, particularly if the crime on trial is
similar to the prior offenses.”232 Notwithstanding that the jury typically receives
instructions to consider character evidence only with respect to truthfulness,233
the evidence reﬂects more generally on the likelihood that the defendant
committed the crime. And as a result, the impeachment exception has a pro-
found effect on whether defendants choose to take the stand.234
The difﬁculty that jurors have “unbiting the apple of knowledge” in response
226. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
227. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
228. FED. R. EVID. 608.
229. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B).
230. State v. Jensen, 2011 WI App 3, ¶¶ 85–88, 331 Wis. 2d 440, 479–81, 794 N.W.2d 482, 502
(Wis. Ct. App. 2010).
231. See Kertscher, supra note 24 (reporting that the jurors were bothered by the images and that
they affected evaluations of the defendant’s demeanor as well).
232. Uviller, supra note 47, at 869; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand
on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial
Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1357 (2009) (reporting a statistically signiﬁcant association
between the jury’s exposure to a defendant’s criminal record and convictions in cases coded as having
weaker evidence); Edith Greene & Mary Dodge, The Inﬂuence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror
Decision Making, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 67 (1995) (“Mock jurors were more likely to convict the
defendant when they had evidence of a prior conviction than when they had evidence of a prior
acquittal or no record evidence. . . . Judge’s limiting instructions were ineffective in guiding jurors’ use
of prior record evidence.”).
233. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
234. See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—Lessons
from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 486, 490–91 (2008) (ﬁnding that, of
factually innocent defendants who did testify, only forty-three percent had a criminal record that could
have been introduced against them, but of the factually innocent defendants who did not testify,
ninety-one percent had a criminal record that could have been exposed to the jury); Eisenberg & Hans,
supra note 232, at 1357 (documenting that sixty percent of defendants without criminal records chose
to testify, compared to forty-ﬁve percent of defendants with criminal records).
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to pro forma cautionary instructions has been widely observed.235 Several
opinions recognize that limiting instructions may fall short of their intended
effect. “Discrimination so subtle,” Judge Cardozo famously remarked, “is a feat
beyond the compass of ordinary minds.”236 Justice Robert Jackson termed them
an “unmitigated ﬁction,”237 and Judge Learned Hand described the “mental
gymnastic[s]” jurors must perform for such instructions to be effective.238 But
because limiting instructions are essential to the administration of the jury
system, as well as to the application of an evidence code with many rules of
limited admissibility, most courts do not scrutinize them and only partially
acknowledge their inaccuracy.239
Judicially recognized limitations on the curative effect of limiting instructions
come exclusively from the Supreme Court’s decisions on the admissibility of
confessions. The Court has determined that, notwithstanding instructions, juries
are incapable of discounting the prejudicial effect of a coerced confession240 or
a codefendant’s confession.241 Although that is certainly true, it may be equally
difﬁcult for jurors to ignore prior convictions,242 the defendant’s failure to
testify,243 and pretrial publicity.244 Or, at least, there is no data-based reason to
235. DAMASˇKA, supra note 134, at 50; see also FRANK, supra note 217, at 184 (comparing limiting
instructions to “exorcising phrases intended to drive out evil spirits”); Uviller, supra note 47, at 869
(“Although jurors seem to digest knotty principles, no one can believe in actual compliance with
instructions of this sort.”).
236. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 104 (1933).
237. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) (portraying limiting instructions as “pragmatic” and
“rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it represents a
reasonable practical accommodation”).
238. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932) (describing a limiting instruction as
“the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but
anybody’s else”).
239. Peter Smith, for example, has argued that judges are reluctant to abandon the ﬁction that juries
follow instructions because foreswearing limiting instructions would “work signiﬁcant, and perhaps
severely constraining, changes in accepted rules of evidence” and potentially require “mistrials in every
case in which inadmissible evidence is heard by the jury.” Smith, supra note 214, at 1492. Smith argues
further that, if jurors cannot be presumed to follow instructions, then the legitimacy of the jury system
as a whole is in peril. Id.
240. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964) (explaining that such evidence “inevitably
injects irrelevant and impermissible considerations of truthfulness of the confession into the assessment
of voluntariness”).
241. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (“[T]here are some contexts in which the risk
that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital
to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”);
cf. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 72 (1979) (stating that confessions present “probably the most
probative and damaging evidence” (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 139 (White, J., dissenting)), abrogated
by Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987)).
242. See Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefﬁcacy of Limiting Instructions: When
Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 47 (1985)
(concluding from an empirical study that presentation of the defendant’s criminal record increases the
likelihood of conviction and that “limiting instructions do not appear to correct that error”).
243. See Grifﬁn v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (considering if “the inference of guilt for
failure to testify as to facts peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge is in any event natural and
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conclude that jurors have more difﬁculty following instructions with respect to
confessions. The available social science indicates that limiting instructions fall
short when it comes to any highly salient or emotionally charged content, and
that improving them will require broader correction of their ﬂawed premise.
The standard formulation of the ﬁction contained in limiting instructions is
that courts are relying on a factually incorrect assumption that juries will follow
them.245 But “jurors following instructions” is a presumption rather than a
ﬁction. And jurors generally do follow instructions, or at least they try. Fo-
cusing on “following instructions” as the core ﬁction has inhibited reform; no
court wants to accept the consequences of jurors ignoring other kinds of
instructions.246 Moreover, while it is obvious that jurors cannot follow them to
the letter, it is also apparent that limiting instructions serve some purpose
beyond efﬁciency and external legitimacy. Advocates routinely request them,
and both the rules of evidence and case law recognize some degree of opera-
tional effect.247 If the discussion of limiting instructions were to refocus on
insights from narrative theory rather than these general concerns with juror
compliance, then reforming instructions would not risk abandoning them alto-
gether.
Narrative theory sheds light on the meaning and force of evidence outside of
any linear presentation or frame-by-frame processing. Testimony has a refrac-
tive quality and both illuminates and bounces off other parts of the trial nar-
rative. Because each new piece of evidence ﬁts into a “shifting mosaic,”248 its
effect is hard to classify or quantify. The narrative lens exposes the difﬁculty of
irresistible”); see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 1477, 1534–35 (1999) (explaining that “[j]udges who want jurors to take seriously the principle
that guilt should not be inferred from a refusal to waive the privilege against self-incrimination will
have to come up with a credible explanation for why an innocent person might fear the consequences of
testifying,” but that he is “not sure there is a credible explanation”).
244. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 98, at 190 (analyzing empirical tests that found pretrial publicity
linked to a sixteen percent increase in overall conviction rates).
245. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 214, at 1450–51.
246. Id. at 1478–80 (claiming that “new legal ﬁctions” such as instructions appeal to judges because
they “serve a legitimating function and because their abandonment might have de-legitimating conse-
quences”).
247. See FED. R. EVID. 105 advisory committee’s note (suggesting that jurors can disregard inadmis-
sible evidence but disavowing “any implication that limiting or curative instructions are sufﬁcient in all
situations”); FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note (citing the potential effectiveness of a
curative instruction as a factor in balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial
effect); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301, 303 (1981) (stating that an admonishment to the jury is a
sufﬁciently “powerful tool” to “‘remove from the jury’s deliberations any inﬂuence of unspoken
adverse inferences’” (quoting Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339 (1978))); see also Sklansky, supra
note 96 (rebutting the conventional wisdom that limiting instructions are totally ineffective and
concluding that they “probably do work, although imperfectly and better under some circumstances
than others”).
248. United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); see also Ryan v. United States,
759 F. Supp. 2d 975, 980 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (commenting on defendant’s argument that the evidence on
various counts of conviction was intertwined and “went into one churning cauldron”), vacated, 132 S.
Ct. 2099 (2012); BURNS, supra note 36, at 150 (“Stories solve the problem of information overload by
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disentangling implicit and explicit inﬂuences, and the theory of legal ﬁctions
suggests some solutions. The way to render ﬁctions “wholly safe,” according to
Lon Fuller, is to use them only with “complete consciousness of [their] fal-
sity.”249 Their distorting effect “varies inversely with the acuteness” of the
awareness of their untruth.250 Making them “safe” requires redeﬁnition, or “a
compensatory change [that] takes place in the meaning of the words or phrases
involved, which operates to bridge the gap that previously existed between the
ﬁction and reality.”251 Simply put, courts should stop pretending that juries did
not hear evidence at all, expressly acknowledge the signiﬁcance of what they
did hear, and offer instructions that might counteract the preexisting schemas
that can affect fact ﬁnders’ interpretations of evidence. Understanding the limits
and implications of the story model does not require broad constraints on the
form in which evidence is presented so much as information that can heighten
jurors’ attention.
C. USING LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS TO COUNTERACT NARRATIVE BIAS
Judges cannot ultimately control what evidence jurors will consider for
which propositions or how much weight they will give it. At some level, juries
consider all evidence for all purposes.252 But instructions could be more than
incantations if courts substituted useful concepts for the pretense of not hearing.
Merely instructing jurors to purge certain considerations only removes explicit
ones, even when jurors act in entirely good faith. Implicit inﬂuences may have
the most powerful effect on how jurors listen and what they privilege, but most
instructions ignore them and thus give them free reign.
The hybrid model of jury decision making outlined above highlights some of
the shortcomings of limiting instructions. Giving instructions after receipt of all
the evidence conﬂicts with the cognitive psychological research ﬁnding that
jurors associate new material with previously received information.253 Telling
jurors not to take evidence into account also precludes deliberations on the
forbidden evidence or inferences. Yet insights from narrative theory—combined
with empirical ﬁndings that jurors can use multiple cognitive processes, that
those ways of thinking interact, and that conﬂicting models can challenge and
change each other—indicate that candid deliberation will help jurors disregard
allowing a continuing reintegration of new information and reorganization of that information accord-
ing to the changes in meaning that the new information allows or requires.”).
249. FULLER, supra note 209, at 9–10; see also id. at 22 (“Redeﬁnition is proper where it results in
the creation of a useful concept—where the dead (redeﬁned) ﬁction ﬁlls a real linguistic need.”).
250. Id. at 10.
251. Id. at 14.
252. BURNS, supra note 36, at 147.
253. See Simon, supra note 65, at 530–31 (discussing the coherence effect); see also Burns, supra
note 160, at 1437 (“[A] single additional detail, and certainly a constellation of additional details, can
substantially change the signiﬁcance of the stories told at trial.”).
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the most distorting evidence.254 Other theories of social psychology suggest
that, even were fact ﬁnders able to disregard forbidden information, they may
not be willing to do so under the conditions imposed by standard limiting
instructions. According to ironic processes and reactance theory, for example,
limiting instructions delivered without any supporting rationale may have a
backﬁre effect that underscores inadmissible evidence.255 Most individuals
strongly prefer to maintain their autonomy and, when they feel it to be threat-
ened, may perform the restricted behaviors to reestablish freedom.256
If courts were more attentive to the candor, content, and timing of instruc-
tions, they could capitalize on potential de-biasing effects.257 Though it may be
impossible to excise particular pieces of evidence or to wholly prohibit the
consideration of evidence for particular purposes, an informed jury’s reliance on
that evidence can be reduced. Instructions could enable jurors to deliberate
effectively about what they hear, could explain why admissibility is limited, and
could prepare jurors before they receive evocative evidence. Those changes
might foreground objective processes and help jurors counter narrative expecta-
tions rather than unconsciously fulﬁll them.
First, permitting mention of inadmissible evidence—and its role in the narra-
tive the jury constructs—holds promise for later neutralizing its impact on
deliberations. The jury system itself depends in part on the idea that com-
paring different interpretations and debating the signiﬁcance of the facts
makes the whole greater than the sum of its parts, and that juror deliberations
produce a “counterbalancing of various biases.”258 There is a useful and grow-
ing body of research on the nature of the information that juries receive and
the way in which they receive it, but the effect of the deliberative process itself
254. See Sloman, supra note 97, at 11 (“Situations abound in which people ﬁrst solve a problem in a
manner consistent with one form of reasoning and then, either with or without external prompting,
realize and admit that a different form of reasoning provides an alternative and more justiﬁable
answer.”).
255. See Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 34, 34 (1994)
(explaining that the effort to suppress thoughts actually underscores them because “processes that
undermine the intentional control of mental states are inherent in the very exercise of such control”);
see also Kerri L. Pickel et al., Jurors’ Responses to Unusual Inadmissible Evidence, 36 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 466, 476 (2009) (“[T]he jurors’ primary objective is to decide on a verdict, so the operating
process must seek information relevant to this task . . . [which] is not semantically unrelated to the
inadmissible evidence [presented at trial], so the former may serve as a retrieval cue for the latter,
making suppression of it difﬁcult.”).
256. One of the earliest and best-known demonstrations of this effect is the ﬁnding in a 1959
experiment that mock jurors who were informed that a defendant was covered by insurance (which is
not admissible on the issue of damages) awarded slightly higher damages ($37,000) than mock jurors
who were informed that the defendant had no insurance coverage ($33,000). When expressly instructed
to set aside the insurance information in their deliberations, jurors awarded even higher damages:
$46,000. Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 754 (1959).
257. For an analogue, see the discussion of an instruction intended to alert jurors to implicit biases in
Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1181–84 (2012).
258. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978); see also Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492,
501 (1896) (“The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and
by arguments among the jurors themselves.”).
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is under theorized.259 Deliberations are complex and difﬁcult to recreate clini-
cally. Little is known about them relative to other aspects of the trial. Indeed,
it is a touchstone of the jury system that deliberations are rarely if ever
examined.260 Two notable exceptions include videotaped deliberations of ﬁfty
civil juries in Arizona state cases and the earlier (and controversial) Chicago
Jury Project, in which members of actual jury pools listened to hypothetical
cases and reached verdicts.261 Those studies shed some light on how delibera-
tions interact with the story model. As scholars have noted, “[i]t appears that
juries try to reconcile their individual narratives and arrive at a consistent story
they can all agree on.”262 The process is a “combination of rational persuasion,
sheer social pressure, and the psychological mechanism by which individual
perceptions undergo change when exposed to group discussion.”263
There are some studies that contradict this model of dynamic deliberation and
conclude that it emphasizes, rather than attenuates, the potency of inadmissible
evidence. In the political context, exploration of the effect of deliberation has
revealed that it can “make group members more extreme in their views than
they were before they started to talk.”264 Researchers have also found that
deliberation may magnify inaccuracies because “[a]s the size of the majority
grows, the statements about evidence and arguments that support the majority
position become more numerous than the comments that support the minority
view, and there is increasing pressure on the shrinking minority to conform.”265
The weight of the data suggests, however, that when a unanimous jury verdict is
259. See Groscup & Tallon, supra note 175, at 47 (“[T]he Story Model is well-articulated in terms of
the individual juror’s information processing, but there is a lack of research investigating the impact
story construction has on jury decision-making. It is largely unknown how the Story Model will interact
with the deliberation process to inﬂuence and inform decision-making.”); see also Joel D. Lieberman et
al., Inadmissible Evidence and Pretrial Publicity: The Effects (and Ineffectiveness) of Admonitions to
Disregard, in JURY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 175, at 67, 78 (noting the discrepancy between criminal
trials and laboratory-based juror simulations because of the absence of deliberation and citing studies
on group verdicts that indicate diminished inadmissible-evidence effects); Pickel et al., supra note 255,
at 479 (“As with most studies of inadmissible evidence, a limitation of the current experiments is that
the jurors made decisions as individuals but did not deliberate.” (citation omitted)).
260. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987) (explaining that “long-recognized and
very substantial concerns support the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry”).
261. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 112, at 137–40 (discussing some of the deliberations recorded
during the Arizona Jury Project); see also HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 486
(1966) (describing the dynamic in deliberations, including talk that “moves in small bursts of coher-
ence, shifting from topic to topic with remarkable ﬂexibility”); Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision
Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 627
(2001) (reviewing 206 studies, 70 of which used actual juries); Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The
American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 323 (1991) (discussing the impact and
legacy of the Chicago Jury Project).
262. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 112, at 137.
263. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 261, at 489.
264. See David Schkade et al., What Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 915, 915
(2007) (focusing on political discussion); see also Simon, supra note 65, at 518 (mentioning polariza-
tion research, which demonstrates “that deliberation in groups causes systematic shifts that amplify the
group members’ predeliberation positions”).
265. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 112, at 144.
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required, jurors are willing to change voting preferences, and that deliberation
can mitigate polarization by providing jurors with identity afﬁrmation through
the group dynamic rather than the assertion of previously held beliefs.266
Thus, one possibility is allowing jurors to deliberate on—and therefore
reafﬁrm—the permissible and impermissible purposes of evidence. Jury schol-
ars Shari Seidman Diamond and Neil Vidmar have advocated for more detailed
instructions along these lines. In the context of the rule prohibiting jury consider-
ation of insurance coverage, they argue that “simply ignoring [a] topic generally
will not prevent it from being raised.”267 A frank and accurate instruction, they
maintain, “promises to be the most effective way to combat misinformation
about, and inappropriate inﬂuence from, jury discussions about insurance.”268
Candid instructions that acknowledge the impact of character evidence, explain
its limited admissibility, and allow jurors to discuss the impression it left—
instead of simply charging jurors to ignore it altogether with respect to the
underlying offense—might be productive as well. Allowing consideration of
the evidence to this extent also has the potential to counteract ironic process
effects, which make the inﬂuence of impermissible information stronger pre-
cisely because the effort to dispel the thought heightens its accessibility.269
Allowing deliberation on forbidden topics makes space to collectively reinforce
the instruction to disregard them. It also transcends simple directives to be
266. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kerwin & David R. Shaffer, Mock Jurors Versus Mock Juries: The Role of
Deliberations in Reactions to Inadmissible Testimony, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 153, 158
(1994) (concluding that instructions are more likely to be followed when jurors meet as a collective
body rather than when they vote for a verdict individually). For a discussion of the reduction of
defensive biases through afﬁrmations of valued self-identity, see David K. Sherman & Geoffrey L.
Cohen, Accepting Threatening Information: Self-Afﬁrmation and the Reduction of Defensive Biases, 11
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 119, 120–22 (2002).
267. Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics,
87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1911 (2001). The authors document jury speculation about forbidden topics such
as insurance coverage and attorneys’ fees awards and suggest disclosure of the parties’ insurance status
accompanied by an instruction on its irrelevance. Id.; see also VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 112, at 163
(recounting jury deliberations during which jurors read aloud the instruction on considering prior
felonies only for credibility and reminded each other of its intended use); Thomas R. Carretta &
Richard L. Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL 291, 307–08 (1983) (concluding, from mock jury deliberations, that jurors undertake “self-
monitoring” and remind each other to disregard inadmissible evidence). A related argument that
prior-crimes evidence should be broadly admitted was recently advanced by Ronald Allen and Larry
Laudan. In their view
[o]nly in that way can jurors arrive at an informed assessment of the bearing, frequency,
and magnitude of the prior crimes they have reasonably inferred the defendant to have
committed . . . exclusion can do nothing whatever to block jurors from prejudicially over-
interpreting the relevance of the priors that they suppose the defendant to have.
Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence and Other Myths of
the Criminal Justice Process, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 522 (2011).
268. Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 267, at 1911.
269. Lieberman et al., supra note 259, at 86 (suggesting that a technique that shows promise for
reducing ironic process effects—from the clinical arena of paradoxical interventions—would be “to
actually have the individual focus on the to-be-suppressed thought”).
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“objective,” which can merely amplify identity-protective cognition.270 A broader
mandate for deliberation could thus mitigate some of the drawbacks of narrative
constructs by exposing implicit processes to external critique and encouraging
the formation of new commitments.271
A second, related approach with the potential to improve decision making
involves reframing the content of instructions to include procedural justiﬁca-
tions for exclusion. Again, there are some contrary ﬁndings,272 but the research
suggests that explaining the rationale for admonitions to disregard information
enhances the effectiveness of the instruction.273 The possibility of a reinforce-
ment effect for a strong procedural instruction, for example, ﬁnds some empiri-
cal support in analyses of recorded juror deliberations.274 When the policy
underlying exclusion is explained, jurors better understand the core purposes of
trial and their role.275 And offering logical reasons for exclusion can shape an
270. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated
Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2011).
271. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205,
206 (1989) (asserting that group deliberation “forces people to realize that there are different ways of
interpreting the same facts” and that even though “this rarely provokes a prompt revision of their own
views, it necessarily reminds the jury members that their perceptions are partly conjectural” and that
“alternative construals are possible”); see also VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 112, at 162 (“[D]eliberating
groups of adults who learned of a defendant’s prior criminal record were obedient to the judge’s
instructions, even admonishing each other that they were supposed to disregard the criminal record if
one of them mentioned it.”). But see Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies,
and Jury Bias, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 435 (1990) (reporting that deliberations may increase the
effect of publicity on jurors).
272. See, e.g., Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal
Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 407, 407 (1995) (documenting a backﬁre effect
with regard to prior-conviction evidence accompanied by a judicial explanation, although not with
regard to hearsay evidence accompanied by instructions as to unreliability). Another discouraging
ﬁnding in the research is that judges perform no better than jurors in experiments gauging their ability
to disregard improper considerations. See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 112, at 164 (noting that “legal
training does not necessarily make judges less prone to make certain errors in following the law” (citing
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 777 (2001))).
273. See Lieberman et al., supra note 259, at 78 (citing various studies suggesting that, “if jurors are
given a logical reason for why evidence is inadmissible and they believe it to be legitimate, then
instructions to disregard the evidence can be successful”); see also, e.g., Diamond & Vidmar, supra
note 267, at 1911 (arguing that “routinely incorporating the instruction in the jurors’ normal instruction
package promises to be the most effective way to combat misinformation about, and inappropriate
inﬂuence from, jury discussions about insurance”); Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper,
Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 513, 558 (1992) (“When jurors are taken seriously and efforts are made to deal with their concerns
and expectations, that is, when they are treated as active co-participants rather than passive sponges,
they appear to be willing and able to respond more appropriately to the dictates of legal rules.”).
274. Ellsworth, supra note 271, at 222 (reporting that 114 of 172 remarks in recorded deliberations
about jurors’ duties were about the judge’s instructions to disregard outside inﬂuences, avoid specula-
tion about sustained objections, or leave aside considerations as to the penalty or consequences of the
verdict).
275. See Eugene Borgida & Roger Park, The Entrapment Defense: Juror Comprehension and
Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 32 (1988) (stating that jurors more readily disregard
prior-conviction evidence upon instruction if they share an “intuitive view” that it should not be used);
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intuitive acceptance that some evidence ought to be set aside.
Both the analysis of the story model’s effect on trial and the social science
on the impossibility of directed forgetting counsel in favor of this mindful
discounting approach. Take belief perseverance, for example. It causes informa-
tion to bind quickly to existing receptors and makes it difﬁcult to disaggregate
and undo perceptions. Consequently, effective instructions have to address both
information itself and its organizing principles. As one study puts it, “ignoring
the information itself is not enough” because the “inferences that explain and
accommodate the information into an integrated picture of the world must also
be ignored, or the information will affect decision making indirectly.”276 Proce-
dural instructions that help shape jurors’ intuitions about evidence have the
potential to challenge those inferences. Similarly, consider “reactance theory,”
which is the tendency documented by social scientists for jurors to ﬁnd forbid-
den information more attractive when they are deprived of the freedom to
choose it.277 Strong admonitions will be most effective when they respect
decisional freedom by allowing jurors to conclude that information should be
disregarded.
Furthermore, procedural justice instructions draw upon the generally high
level of juror compliance. Researchers have documented, for example, that
juries “diligently review[] the evidence, attempt[] to understand it, pa[y] atten-
tion to the judicial instructions, and appl[y] the law as they underst[and] it.”278
Enlisting jurors in the larger purposes of trial leverages that good faith. Accord-
ingly, instructions should convey enough information to ensure that jurors buy
into the rationale for exclusion. A recent study on the difﬁculty that judges
themselves have adhering to limiting instructions underscores that offering a
reason for admonitions to disregard information can increase the effectiveness
of an instruction.279 In a bench trial, the same judge who determines the
Shari Seidman Diamond & Jason Schklar, The Jury: How Does Law Matter?, in HOW DOES LAW
MATTER? 191, 205–06 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998) (conveying the results of a 1992
experiment testing juror responses to antitrust cases, in which jurors who were told that damages would
be trebled by statute or given that information combined with an admonition not to lower the award as a
result, gave reduced damages, but jurors who were treated as “collaborators” and given a detailed
instruction explaining the congressional purpose behind the trebling provision did not give reduced
awards); see also Sklansky, supra note 96 (“[J]uries should be told why they are being asked to
disregard evidence or to use it only a particular way . . . .”). But cf. Wistrich et al., supra note 154, at
1258–59 (reporting experimental ﬁndings indicating that judges often fail to ignore the very evidence
they have deemed inadmissible).
276. See Wistrich et al., supra note 154, at 1269; see also John A. Bargh & Ezequiel Morsella, The
Unconscious Mind, 3 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 73 (2008) (explaining that, although the content of
thoughts may be accessible, the decision-making process is beyond awareness).
277. See Sharon Wolf & David A. Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of
Judicial Admonishment To Disregard on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 205,
213 (1977).
278. Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 267, at 1874.
279. The study appears in Wistrich et al., supra note 154. See also Diamond & Casper, supra note
273, at 558 (ﬁnding that, “when judicial instructions acknowledged jurors’ inclinations to reduce their
awards and jurors were given a clear justiﬁcation for not reducing their awards, the windfall avoidance
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admissibility of evidence then serves as the trier of fact. And the system simply
“trusts judges to be able to see inﬂammatory and unfairly prejudicial evidence
and then to be able to put it into perspective, not allowing it to warp their
judgment.”280 Yet, if narrative is the deep structure broadly affecting all informa-
tion processing, there is no reason to think judges are any more immune to the
effect of prejudicial information than jurors. And it turns out they are not.281
But, in one set of experiments, researchers also identiﬁed evidence obtained in
violation of constitutional rights as the one category in which judges actually
could reliably and deliberately disregard inadmissible information.282
For their part, jurors tend to favor reliability rationales. Most of the extant
studies indicate that, when instructed to ignore evidence on procedural grounds
like law enforcement violations of criminal procedure rules, jurors could not
disregard it, whereas they could set aside evidence when told that it was
otherwise invalid, inaccurate, or lacking in credibility.283 It is the discredited
nature of the information, and thus its relative lack of utility in terms of
constructing the events, that enables compliance with the instruction. The story
model suggests that jurors ought to be informed that there are accuracy con-
cerns with certain evidence. For example, character evidence is not strongly
predictive of criminal activity,284 eyewitness identiﬁcations are often mis-
taken,285 and technological methods of lie detection are not widely regarded as
reliable.286
This theory ﬁnds support in studies of a subject’s attachment to stored
information as well. General instructions to be objective do little to counteract
effect was substantially meliorated”); Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the
Courtroom, 92 MINN. L. REV. 573, 629 (2008) (“Instructions not only communicate the rules of law, but
also the rules of jury behavior. . . . Instructions that address the relevance and irrelevance of [demeanor]
can help direct the discussion of jurors as they reach their verdicts.”) (citing Anne Bowen Poulin,
The Jury: The Criminal Justice System’s Different Voice, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1411 (1994))).
280. LAUDAN, supra note 45, at 25.
281. See Wistrich et al., supra note 154, at 1251.
282. Id.
283. See Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard,
and the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1046, 1050 (1997).
284. See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the “Grotesque” Doctrine of Character Evi-
dence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 741,
754–55 (2008) (highlighting behavioral studies that show the combined inﬂuence of situations and
traits).
285. See, e.g., Benton et al., supra note 179.
286. Polygraph evidence is generally inadmissible because it lacks reliability, but courts also suspect
it of overwhelming jurors’ own judgments on credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S.
303, 313 (1998) (“By its very nature, polygraph evidence may diminish the jury’s role in making
credibility determinations.”). In one experiment, however, researchers found that mock jurors receiving
both polygraph evidence and a warning about the fallibility of the technology issued guilty judgments
twelve percent less often than those who did not receive the warning but twelve percent more often than
those shielded from the polygraph evidence entirely. See Ann Cavoukian & Ronald J. Heslegrave, The
Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in Court: Some Empirical Findings, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 117,
122–24 (1980).
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the appeal of evidence that accords with what jurors already believe. But if
pressed to imagine their reaction to evidence pointing to the opposite conclu-
sion, jurors may grow more receptive to contrary information.287 Courts might
accomplish something similar by instructing jurors that prior convictions indeed
appear relevant but may not be as telling as they imagine. An explanation could
include the rationale for allowing the consideration of character on the issue of
credibility. Jurors might then be more likely to accept that the evidence has
some import with respect to truth telling but offers little useful information
about criminal culpability. That insight could also enrich jurors’ discussions of
the prohibited inferences during deliberations and, thus, further reduce its
power.
Finally, courts might prime jurors with instructions earlier in the trial to
prevent the construction of a narrative that includes improper considerations.288
Instructions designed to forewarn jurors of high-impact evidence and its poten-
tially biasing effects—including, perhaps, an explanation of the unconscious
range of inﬂuences it might have—could better prepare them to resist its
persuasive force. In one study based on a simulated murder trial, preinstructed
jurors exposed to gruesome photographs returned signiﬁcantly fewer convic-
tions than the participants who were admonished only after seeing the photo-
graphs.289 Most juries receive their instructions just before they begin
deliberations, once all of the evidence has been presented but, particularly
with regard to due process issues, preinstructions might increase both com-
prehension and compliance.290 As David Sklansky explains, “complying with
an evidentiary instruction will often, or even usually, require the jury to undo a
complicated set of interactions between the evidence in question and other
evidence in the case.”291 Early warnings, however, might prevent integration of
the evidence into a familiar narrative paradigm.292 They might also mitigate
287. See Lieberman et al., supra note 259, at 81 (“[A]lthough belief perseverance can be a powerful
force, it can be overcome by prompting participants to explain why beliefs opposite to their own may
be true.”).
288. See Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 72, at 705 (“Persuasion studies have demonstrated that
forewarning participants that they will be exposed to prejudicial information is effective at creating
resistance and reducing the effectiveness of subsequent persuasive messages.”).
289. Rachel K. Cush & Jane Goodman Delahunty, The Inﬂuence of Limiting Instructions on
Processing and Judgments of Emotionally Evocative Evidence, 13 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 110, 110
(2006); see also Vicki L. Smith, Impact of Pretrial Instruction on Jurors’ Information Processing and
Decision Making, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 220, 220–28 (1991).
290. See Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, On the Requirements of Proof: The Timing of
Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1877, 1877 (1979);
cf. Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 72, at 684 (“Because deliberations occur after the presentation of
trial evidence, they may be too late to effectively reduce the impact of inadmissible evidence.”).
291. Sklansky, supra note 96.
292. As Pennington and Hastie stated in the foundational piece describing the story model, “maxi-
mal sharing of information and minimal early commitment to decisions will ensure the broadest
coverage of evidence and relevant background knowledge.” Pennington & Hastie, Cognitive Theory,
supra note 58, at 556. Dan Simon’s research on jury decision making has demonstrated in other
contexts that priming, framing, and the role in which the jury imagines itself when it receives
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spillover effects on admissible evidence, including the coherence effect that
prompts a decision maker to experience “supporting evidence as stronger and
more probative, while the contrary evidence wanes.”293
The federal rules, adopted in most state jurisdictions as well, would permit
preliminary, intermediate, and concluding instructions.294 It is also within the
court’s province “to assist the jury in arriving at a just conclusion by explaining
and commenting upon the evidence.”295 There are some administrability con-
cerns and one recurring objection to preliminary instructions is that the appli-
cable law depends in part on the evidence introduced, which is not entirely
predictable before the trial unfolds.296 The judge, however, can seek preliminary
agreement from the parties and advise the jury that the instructions are subject
to revision and addition as the trial proceeds.
The reforms outlined here are neither costly nor burdensome, but they
illustrate one way in which a clear understanding of the story model, its
limitations, and its effects can improve the accuracy of adjudication. Jurors will
be best equipped to counteract the deceptive power of narrative if they are
aware of its impact, motivated to adhere to the admissible evidence, and able to
adjust their judgments accordingly.297 Surfacing potential sources of error in
deliberations, offering juries a rationale for the evidentiary rules they are asked
to follow, and alerting them in advance to the powerful inﬂuence but limited
utility of certain kinds of evidence can help create those conditions.298
information might affect how evidence is processed. See Dan Simon et al., On the Objectivity of
Investigations: An Experiment 2 (Aug. 18, 2008) (conference paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id1130103 (reporting that participants given adversarial assignments, ambigu-
ous fact patterns, and instructions to evaluate them objectively were polarized in the direction of their
assignment); see also Blair H. Sheppard & Neil Vidmar, Adversary Pretrial Procedures and Testimonial
Evidence: Effects of Lawyer’s Role and Machiavellianism, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320, 320
(1980) (ﬁnding that witnesses who observed a ﬁght and were interviewed by adversary lawyers before
testifying biased their testimony in favor of the adversary lawyer’s client, compared to those inter-
viewed by nonadversary lawyers, which in turn had an inﬂuence on the guilt judgments of adjudica-
tors).
293. Simon, supra note 98, at 196; see also id. at 199 (stating that, with later instructions, “the
biasing effect of the exposure on the other, legitimate evidence items is bound to be harder to reverse”).
294. See FED. R. CIV. P. 51(b)(3) (providing that the court “may instruct the jury at any time before
the jury is discharged”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 30(c) (“The court may instruct the jury before or after the
arguments are completed, or at both times.”).
295. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933).
296. See William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 130 (“[J]urors
arrive at tentative opinions in the case early in the trial, regardless of whether they are preinstructed.
The beneﬁts of improved comprehension outweigh any concern over such tentative opinions.” (footnote
omitted)).
297. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:
Unwanted Inﬂuences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1994). Of course, the
conclusions and proposals here inevitably “lump” jurors together, even though there will be individual
variation in the commission of errors and the effect of bias. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 207 (2006).
298. Implementing these ideas would require attention to juror comprehension of instructions as
well. On reforms aimed at drafting, including vocabulary and syntax, see generally Joel D. Lieberman
& Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
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CONCLUSION
A ﬁnal question concerns the relationship between stories and the legitimacy
and moral credibility of trials.299 On the one hand, coherent narratives that
allow both jurors and observers to construct accounts consistent with their
experience and common sense may be perceived as more legitimate.300 On the
other, outcomes that ultimately appear at odds with the facts or seem to rest on
improper considerations, undermine conﬁdence in the justice system. A balance
between convincing narratives and fair and reliable fact-ﬁnding is essential not
only to individual defendants, but also because of the broader messages that
trials send.301 Despite declining numbers of trials,302 they remain the aspect of
the law most “vivid” to the public.303 Trials also function as contemporary
morality plays, continually “develop the norms that ought to apply to the basic
POL’Y & L. 589 (1997); Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of
Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081 (2001); and Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reforming the Language
of Jury Instructions, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 37 (1993).
299. See Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims
and Occasional Conﬂicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 212 (2012)
(explaining that “legitimacy” stems from “fair adjudication and professional enforcement” and “moral
credibility” stems from “just results”).
300. Charles Nesson has argued, for example, that narrative coherence is essential in order for a
verdict to be perceived as legitimate. Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof
and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1390–91 (1985). This is relevant to both the
external reception of a verdict and the internal experience of participants in the process, from the
litigants themselves to the fact ﬁnders. One of the Jensen jurors, the last holdout who was ultimately
convinced by rereading Julie’s letter, remarked: “I feel that we served justice today, and I am so
comfortable with my decision, I can’t begin to tell you.” DeLong, supra note 167. At least four of the
jurors later appeared at Mark Jensen’s sentencing. Jean Casarez, Jensen Sentencing Packs the Court-
room, CNN IN SESSION BLOG (Feb. 27, 2008, 10:20 AM), http://insession.blogs.cnn.com/2008/02/27/
jensen-sentencing-packs-the-courtroom/.
301. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, in JURY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 175, at 25, 36
(surveying the social science research that demonstrates that “procedural justice judgments were the
most important factors shaping trust and conﬁdence in the courts”).
302. Many commentators have written recently about courtrooms across the country falling dark,
noting the relocation of many legal disputes to the regulatory context and a rise in plea bargains, civil
settlements, and summary dismissals by the courts. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed
Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 172 (2006) (commenting that “the number
of criminal and civil jury trials has declined substantially” and that “the civil jury has for all practical
purposes disappeared”); see also BURNS supra note 119, at 82, 83–85 (citing Marc Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004)) (reporting that the percentage of federal cases going to trial
declined from 11.5 percent of civil cases and 15 percent of criminal cases in 1962 to 1.8 percent of civil
cases and 5 percent of criminal cases by 2002, and that a parallel reduction occurred in the state courts).
303. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 570
(2001); accord Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416 (1993) (trials are the “paramount event” in the
justice system); DAMASˇKA, supra note 134, at 1 (the adversarial trial has become part of the “global
popular culture”); WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S ORIGINS,
TRIUMPHS, TROUBLES, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 155 (2002) (“Trials are only a part of our
system, but they are the apex, the model, the part that is open to the public, reported in the media,
dramatized in TV shows and movies, recounted in popular books, and even broadcast live.”); JAMES
BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW & LEGAL EDUCATION 108 (2002) (calling
trial the “central institution of the law as we know it”).
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structure of society,”304 and serve as catalysts for political debate.305 Because
trials often occur in the hard cases that lie on the margins of civil and criminal
liability, they are vehicles for developing legal concepts and improving doctrine
as well.306 Correctly describing what happens at trial, therefore, matters a great
deal, and improvements to trial design pay dividends with respect to the
credibility and legitimacy of the justice system as a whole.
The characteristics of narrative are in many ways incompatible with the work
that trials do, but this Article does not reach the conclusion that the courtroom
should exclude stories. Nor, even if that were desirable, could any procedure or
reform put a stop to narrative. Jurors of course use stories to organize the
information they receive. Trials address difﬁcult and complex questions about
human behavior, and they need not be mechanistic undertakings. But the story
model is incomplete and recognizing its limitations reveals opportunities to
improve truth seeking and counteract bias. Understanding that the analytical and
emotional coexist and then identifying ways in which subjective processes
introduce error, could lead to corrections for some false premises in trial
procedure and better protections for both the accuracy and the legitimacy of
verdicts.
304. BURNS supra note 119, at 5; see also id. at x (stating that trials stand “astride some of the most
important tensions that have deﬁned our national character”).
305. See id. at 134 (listing historic American trials, such as the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire trial, that
were “public proceedings with public records that provided a basis for long-term and serious political
debates”).
306. See Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1726 (1988)
(noting that litigation often involves disputes that raise novel issues); see also BURNS supra note 119, at
113 (describing trials as “the forum that has traditionally been the place where the rigidity and
sometimes harshness of written law was softened” (emphasis omitted)).
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